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ABSTRACT 
BACKGROUND: The policy implications of the “Coordination Reform,” introduced in 2009, 
became effective at the beginning of 2012. As a result, one of the major changes was a policy 
that shifted payment responsibility for patients ready for discharge to the municipalities 
beginning the same day a patient is deemed ready for discharge by the hospital. This policy is 
in an ongoing implementation phase and a variety of effects and changes has already been and 
will continue to be observed as a result of this measure. 
OBJECTIVE: To examine the effects, on both municipal and hospital behavior and decision 
making, one year after implementation within the municipality of Oslo. More specifically,  to 
explain the variations in delayed discharge, for those somatic care patients who will require 
municipal services upon being discharged, by characteristics of the patients, the hospitals and 
the city districts.  
METHOD: Discharge data from before and after reform implementation was used to 
statistically test for significant differences between 2011 and 2012 in the periods of time 
related to delayed discharges. Probable explanations and predictions, for variations related to 
any significant differences, were then explained by multivariate linear regression using 
continuous time variables related to delayed discharge with independent demographic and 
geographic variables. Variables representing and explaining supply and demand of healthcare 
services within the city districts were then included.  
RESULTS: There was a statistically significant decrease in delayed discharges between 2011 
and 2012. When looking at the individual city districts, this difference can be explained by a 
statistically significant positive effect of the proportion of inhabitants over the age of 80 and a 
significantly negative effect of per person spending on nursing care. The type of municipal 
service location to which patients were sent upon discharge also had a significant effect. The 
results indicate that districts with higher percentages of elderly inhabitants have greater delays 
in discharges, and districts with greater spending on nursing care have less discharge delays.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An interest in focusing on coordination and its improvement is neither new nor foreign to 
health care sectors around the globe. Norway is no exception, and it has proven to be an 
ongoing challenge and concern. This concern has recently resulted in a white paper, defining 
three main challenges facing Norwegian health services, accompanied by suggestions for five 
preliminary steps for meeting those challenges in what has been called “The Coordination 
Reform”(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 2012).  This reform focuses on the 
coordination of primary and secondary health services with an overarching goal for patients to 
receive the “proper treatment – at the right place and right time” (Norwegian Ministry of 
Health and Care Services 2009). In this context, coordination is the integration of different 
levels of healthcare and organizations to improve delivery of services. The policies resulting 
from this reform are in an ongoing implementation phase after becoming effective at the 
beginning of 2012. A variety of effects and changes has already been and will continue to be 
observed as a result of these measures. 
This study aims to examine the effects, likely induced by the change in municipal financial 
responsibility for patients ready for discharge, on both municipal and hospital behavior and 
decision making one year after implementation of the policies suggested in the Coordination 
Reform paper. Data is used from before and after reform implementation, with special 
emphasis given to the municipality of Oslo. More specifically, this analysis seeks to explain 
the variations in delayed discharge for those somatic care patients who will require municipal 
services upon being discharged by characteristics of the patients, the hospitals and the city 
districts.  
The primary function of this before-and-after descriptive evaluation is to answer the following 
questions of interest: 
1. Is there a significant difference between 2011 and 2012 (one year before reform 
implementation and one year after) in the periods of time from discharge ready 
notification to actual discharge? 
2. If there is a significant difference, what explains or predicts the variation in the 
periods? 
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The study also aims to find probable explanations for observations made in answering these 
questions by looking at various differences among the city districts of Oslo. This will be done 
by statistically testing different explanations for any observed variation between different 
periods of time related to a patient’s discharge date using multiple independent predictor 
variables. I anticipate there to be a decrease in the extent of delayed discharge as the 
municipality experiences an increase in the relative costs for providing hospital care for 
patients ready for discharge.  
One of the three major challenges, that was outlined in the paper, is “the patients’ needs for 
coordinated services are not being sufficiently met” (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care 
Services 2009). This specifically relates to the municipality’s responsibility for and 
involvement in health services that are required after hospitalization. Two of the five 
preliminary steps outlined in the reform address the future role of municipalities and their 
associated financial incentives regarding their involvement in providing health services. 
The most important financial aspects, resulting from the reform paper, are seen in one new 
law and one new regulation concerning the municipal financial responsibility for patients 
ready for discharge; Law on Municipal Health Services (Health and Care Act) and the 
Regulations on Municipal Co-funding of Specialist and Municipal Payments for Patients 
Ready for Discharge (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 2011b, a). 
A municipal expense of 4,000 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) per day (paid to the hospital) for 
each day a somatic care patient stays in the hospital after being cleared for discharge (delayed 
discharge) is one of the important financial results of these new provisions. The municipalities 
also have to pay 20% of each somatic medical (non-surgical) DRG (diagnosis related group) 
for each hospital patient (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 2011a). A 
maximum of 30,000 NOK in co-financing has been allocated for each hospital admission, and 
additionally 5.6 billion NOK given to the municipality from the national government to offset 
the new financial burdens for 2012. 
The goal of these new financial regulations is to incentivize the municipalities to evaluate 
how resource utilization affects healthcare, as well as, the appropriateness of use of resources 
(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 2009).  The delayed discharge provision 
results in the municipality having an interest in minimizing the length of hospital stay for 
those patients for which it is responsible. Therefore, the municipalities will be required to 
focus on coordinating short- and long-term care opportunities for those that require such when 
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deemed ready for discharge. Preventative measures, as well as greater focus on primary, 
rather than specialist care, will also become paramount to the municipality in response to their 
responsibility for admission/DRG costs.  
It was expressed in an official national government report, NOU 2005:3, that there may be a 
disagreement between when the specialist level of health care determines a patient is ready for 
discharge and the municipalities’ readiness to accept that patient (2005:3). Based on that, the 
report made a suggestion for the municipalities and the health enterprises of the regional 
health authorities (RHAs) to create agreements for the coordination of delivery of services to 
patients.       
With a focus on decreasing expensive specialist care and providing care at the more 
economical outpatient and municipal levels, the average length of stay was decreased to 5.2 
days in 2004 from 7.5 days in 1989. Additionally, the overall number of hospital beds also 
saw a decrease between 1990 and 2003 going from 16,000 to 14,000.(Johnsen 2006) This 
translated to more patients receiving in-home and municipally based primary care.  
1.1 Bed blocking and delayed discharges 
The terms ‘bed blocking’ and ‘delayed discharge’ have no conventional or agreed upon 
definition, but they both are and have been used synonymously to explain each other (Hall 
and Bytheway 1982).  The term ‘bed blocking’ originated in the United Kingdom and the 
term ‘delayed discharge’ in the United States and Canada (Manzano-Santaella 2010). 
Regardless of word choice, both were, and still are used to describe when a patient no longer 
requires acute hospital care (is ready for discharge) but remains in the hospital due to any 
variety of reasons. Therefore, when a patient remains in the hospital, their discharge has been 
delayed (delayed discharge) and this leads to them occupying a bed, and blocking someone 
else who requires acute hospital treatment from receiving care (bed blocking). Even though 
this is the general concept, the exact definition and accepted terminologies used in practice are 
still debated. Going beyond the debate of semantics, these phenomena have been associated 
with two prominent issues: a lack of timely provision of social services, leading to a failure in 
the planning process and shortages in alternative care options (Manzano-Santaella 2010). 
Within decentralized and semi-centralized models where different responsibilities are held at 
different levels, like that in Norway, certain characteristics emerge. For example, there is an 
incentive for the municipalities to let patients stay in the hospital because they do not pay for 
the hospital services until discharge. Delayed discharges and blocked beds are of concern not 
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only because they prevent others from receiving care, but longer hospital stays can lead to 
complications and other nosocomial conditions and treatments provided in a hospital are, by 
far, more costly than treatments and services provided in other settings (Hauck and Zhao 
2011).  
In line with the aforementioned lack of timely service and care shortages, the financial 
measures implemented as a result of the coordination reform for discharge ready patients is 
directly tied to utilization of hospital beds and the issues of delayed discharge and bed 
blocking. There are a number of ways to address these issues. Four of the most important 
being adding more beds, introducing initiatives to reduce admissions, offering increased day 
services, or having earlier/more efficient discharges which usually incorporates the use of 
intermediate care facilities and transfers to social health care establishments (Manzano-
Santaella 2010). Proper coordination and planning for patient discharges, especially those 
moving on to additional healthcare services, is crucial for patients to move smoothly through 
the system. This system (at least in Norway) is comprised of many elements including 
primary and secondary specialist care, long- and short-term care facilities, including nursing 
homes and rehabilitation centers, social and home care, and acute hospital care. Acute 
hospitalizations account for only part of the broader healthcare services picture but are a 
crucial component in the overall system. The financial policies resulting from the 
coordination reform seek to mitigate this coordination issue; however, they are not the first 
financial provisions used to address this issue in other countries or Norway. Three of the four 
ways to address the issues (all those except adding more beds) were employed or targeted, in 
theory, by the financial incentives. 
Using financial incentives to motivate improvement has been seen in a number of countries 
including Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom (UK). Sweden implemented 
legislation, at the beginning of 1992 called the ‘Elderly Reform’ with a provision that made 
the municipalities responsible for payment for those patients who stayed in the hospital longer 
than 5 days after being identified as discharge ready; 1,800 SEK per day for short-term 
hospitals and 1,300 SEK per day for short term geriatric departments (Styrborn and Thorslund 
1993).  Starting in 1993, Danish counties, responsible for hospital care administration and 
financing, were allowed to charge the municipalities, responsible for post-discharge care 
administration and financing, on a per diem basis for patients who remained hospitalized for a 
reason associated with waiting for a municipal service, yet this is not mandatory (Colmorten, 
Clausen, and Bengtsson 2003). In 2004, the UK’s Community Care Act, a policy which was 
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introduced in 2003 and based on the Swedish model, became effective allowing the hospitals 
to charge the social services departments a daily fee for patients (excluding children, 
maternity patients, mental illness admissions and palliative care) who remained hospitalized 
for more than 48 hours after medically fit for discharge (Bryan 2010).  
Norway, historically, has also implemented similar policies.  In 1999 a regulation that was 
passed the previous year and legally based on a 1982 municipal health services law (enacted 
in 1984) stated that the counties (still in charge of the hospitals at this time) may require 
payment from the municipalities for patients who remain in the hospital after being ready for 
discharge (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 1982). The charges were not 
allowed to begin until 14 days after the municipality had been notified in writing that a patient 
was ready for discharge and, according to the regulation, the price per day was to be 
determined by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Norwegian Ministry of Health and 
Care Services 1998).  A special set of criteria stating what must be included and documented 
in the medical record before a patient is deemed ready for discharge was also outlined in the 
regulation (See section 2.4.1). The 1999 regulation was modified by a 2002 regulation, that 
became effective in 2003, changing the number of days for when payment could begin from 
14 to 10 (7 for the municipality of Oslo) and stating that the municipalities should be familiar 
with the previously set pre-discharge hospital documentation criteria (Norwegian Ministry of 
Health and Care Services 2002). The latest changes, effective January, 1 2012, are seen in a 
new law and regulation that have resulted from the Coordination Reform paper.         
Though Norway was not the first country to implement a financial incentive to address the 
issues of delayed discharge and bed blocking, it is the first to make the financial responsibility 
mandatory and effective on the very same day a patient is considered ready for discharge.  
1.2 Theory 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine differences in delayed discharges, as well as 
possible demographic and geographic variations to explain these differences. Additional 
variables of interest are payment days and the discharge deadlines used to determine them. 
Demand and supply factors will also be added to the analysis to provide a more complete 
picture. I will specifically concentrate on analyzing the variations between city districts.   
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Different possibilities for explaining the variations in delayed discharges exist. Characteristics 
such as socioeconomic, geographic, demographic, as well as supply and demand factors may 
be of significance.  
Delayed discharges will be analyzed using economic models of supply, demand and price/cost 
shifting. The basis for the theory of this study will be developed using a demand model 
framework using these terms. The model framework will describe the relationships between 
health, socioeconomic status, need, supply and consumption of health care services. This sets 
the stage for understanding the price/cost shifting theory that is used to arrive at a general 
hypothesis about utilization of services that affect delayed discharges.  
There are two key players in the collaborative efforts that are ultimately responsible for the 
decision making that also affects delays in patient discharges. One of these two players, the 
hospitals, upon patient admission, initially make an assessment determining that patient’s 
future need for additional services after hospitalization and later notifies the other player, the 
city district, once a decision about the planned or anticipated discharge date has been made. 
After receiving a notification, the city districts, responsible for primary care within the 
municipality, make an assessment resulting in a decision about their ability/willingness to 
accept and provide services for the patient who is to be discharged. These decisions made by 
the hospitals and districts are influenced by different factors which can be evaluated and used 
to form hypotheses about the decision making process’ effect on discharge delays.  
1.3 Data and methodology 
Data for this study is collected from Gerica and Statistics Norway (SSB).  
Gerica is the electronic documentation system used throughout the primary healthcare sector 
in Oslo and used in this study to provide geographic and demographic discharge data, as well 
as, important dates corresponding to the discharge process. This database was used as the 
main data source for the project.  
Statistics Norway provided the supply and demand variable data concerning nursing care, 
elderly population proportion and immigrant population percentage.  
The information used from Gerica consists of data for patient discharges requiring municipal 
services in 2011 and 2012. The discharges were grouped by age, gender, location type 
patients were sent to upon discharge, hospital and city district. The Gerica data was 
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continually checked for quality and accuracy before analysis began. Additionally, the data for 
the two years was merged and the supply and demand variables were added. Using this 
merged and combined dataset, it is possible to conduct an analysis of the differences between 
years and variation primarily in delayed discharge and secondarily, payment obligations.  
An initial quantitative and descriptive assessment of the data was performed followed by 
multi-variable regression analyses investigating relationships among the variables. The 
models investigated variations in delayed discharge based on the research questions and 
hypotheses. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
This introduction included a brief description of delayed discharge and bed blocking with a 
policy review. In chapter two, the Norwegian health care structure, the municipality of Oslo 
and white paper no. 47, “The Coordination Reform,” are broadly discussed with more specific 
detail given to parts directly relating to this study. The theoretical foundation follows in 
chapter three. Chapter four contains the data and methods used in the analyses followed by 
results in chapter five. The paper then concludes with two additional chapters; discussion and 
conclusion.   
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Norwegian health care structure and organization 
Much like the three level government structure of Norway, consisting of national, county 
council and municipal levels, the healthcare sector is comprised of national, regional and local 
levels. The national level of healthcare is represented by the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services. The national level does not actively participate in the provision of care, like that of 
the lower two levels, but rather maintains an oversight and planning function. As explained by 
Jan Johnsen, “the Ministry of Health and Care Services (Helse- omsorgsdepartementet) 
outlines national health policy, prepares major reforms and proposals for legislation, monitors 
their implementation and assists the government in decision-making” (2006, 16). “[It] is 
responsible for administering the following services: primary health care, specialized health 
care, public health, mental health, medical rehabilitation, dental services, pharmacies and 
pharmaceuticals, emergency planning and coordination, policies on molecular biology and 
biotechnology and nutrition and food safety” (Johnsen 2006, 16). The ministry is also 
responsible for the oversight of a number of secondary agencies. Under the Ministry of Health 
and Care Services are four regional health authorities (RHA); North, Midland, West and 
South East (result of a merger of South and East in 2007) as seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) of Norway  (Source: Statistics Norway) 
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These RHAs own 18 independent legal bodies known as local hospital trusts or enterprises 
that are responsible for providing specialist care, which includes hospitals (see Figure 2). The 
RHAs took over administrative control of hospitals when they were transferred from the 19 
counties in 2002 (Johnsen 2006, 136, Hagen and Kaarboe 2006). The lowest level of care and 
services, primary care, is provided at the local level by the current, 428 municipalities (2013). 
This level works to improve population health, treat diseases, and address health issues that 
do not require hospitalization (Johnsen 2006, xiv).  
 
Figure 2. Organizational structure of the regional health authorities, health 
enterprises, and hospitals in Norway (Source: Ministry of Health and Care Services)  
2.1.1 Specialist/hospital secondary care services   
The Hospital Act of 1969 made a unified system for specialist/hospital level care. This Act 
made the 19 counties responsible for planning, constructing and managing hospitals for their 
respective populations. In 2002, this organizational structure changed and the central 
government, by way of five regional health authorities (later changed to four in 2007 with the 
merger of South and East), took over hospital oversight via individual health enterprises (See 
Figures 1 and 2) (Johnsen 2006). This marked a change from what was being called a 
decentralized NHS model to a semi-centralized NHS model because the different levels of 
care were split between different levels of government (Hagen and Kaarboe 2006). The RHAs 
are funded by global budgets, out of pocket payments and activity based financing. Somatic 
hospital services are funded via DRG activity based financing (See Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Norwegian healthcare financial flowchart   
(Source: NOU 2005 on health service coherence)  
2.1.2 Primary care services 
Primary care services became the responsibility of the municipalities in 1984 after the 
introduction of the Municipalities Services Act of 1982. The municipalities also took over the 
responsibility of nursing home care from the counties in 1988 and in 2001 a general 
practitioner (GP) list system was introduced. With the introduction of the list system, all 
citizens were given the right to choose to participate giving them the ability to choose a GP, 
switch lists up to two times per year, and seek a second opinion from another provider 
(Johnsen 2006).    
The primary health services are mainly funded by block grants from the national government 
provided by taxes (See Figure 3). These primary care services include general medical 
services, the general practitioner (GP) scheme, emergency first aid, physiotherapy, nursing 
home care and rehabilitation, as well as other long- and short-term services.  
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Patients’ homes and nursing homes are the most typical places for rehabilitation services to be 
conducted, but it is not uncommon for municipalities to purchase beds in private institutions 
for long-term institutionalized rehabilitation needs (Johnsen 2006, 107).  
Long-term care is broken down into three different sub-sections regulated by two different 
Acts; home-based care and sheltered houses regulated by the Social Services Act, and nursing 
homes by the Municipalities Health Services Act (Johnsen 2006, 108). There is a priority to 
have the greatest efforts aimed at allowing people to remain in their homes receiving care for 
as long as possible. In 2001, patients were afforded the right to an individual treatment plan if 
they required long-term care and coordinated services by the Act on Patients’ Rights (Johnsen 
2006, 132).      
2.2 Municipality of Oslo 
 
Figure 4. Municipality of Oslo map with hospitals   
(Source: OUS, www.oslo-universitetssykehus.no)  
In addition to being the largest city in Norway, Oslo is one of the 19 Norwegian counties. It is 
also the most densely populated city and county in the country. The municipality is made up 
of 15 districts, each with a corresponding primary hospital as seen in Figure 4. Districts 1, 2 
and 4 (Gamle Oslo, Grünerløkka and St. Hanshaugen) are the responsibility of Lovisenberg 
Diakonale Hospital (sykehus). Districts 5, 6 and 7 (Frogner, Ullern and Vestre Aker) are the 
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responsibility of Diakonhjemmet Hospital (sykehus). Districts 3, 8, 9, 13, 14 and 15 (Sagene, 
Nordre Aker, Bjerke, Østensjø, Nordstrand and Søndre Nordstrand) are covered by Oslo 
University Hospital (OUS). A merger took place in 2009 to form OUS. This combined three 
university hospitals: Rikshospitalet (The National Hospital) (including Radiumhospitalet 
(Norwegian Radium Hospital), Ullevål University Hospital and Aker University Hospital into 
one central institution. The remaining three districts within the municipality of Oslo, 10, 11 
and 12 (Grorud, Stovner and Alna) are the responsibility of Akershus University Hospital 
(Ahus) located in the municipality of Lørenskog in the county of Akershus, which is the 
county surrounding the municipality and county of Oslo. These are the major hospitals 
responsible for the specialist health care for the municipality of Oslo, though there are 
additional smaller hospitals within the municipality.  
The responsibilities and coverage areas of the hospitals function as a general outline. 
Different hospitals lack certain services and facilities that others possess. There are special 
agreements among the hospitals within the municipality for treatment of patients from a 
district with a corresponding hospital that does not provide the services they require.     
2.3 The Coordination Reform 
A white paper titled “The Coordination Reform, Proper treatment –at the right place and right 
time” (Report No. 47 to the Storting (2008-2009)) was presented to the Norwegian Parliament 
by the Ministry of Health and Care Services in 2009. The paper explained that the Norwegian 
healthcare system was developing in a way that was unsustainable unless changes were made. 
One of the main culprits was identified as a lack of coordination resulting in money being 
spent incorrectly and inefficiently. In this context, coordination refers to the integration of 
different levels of healthcare and organizations to improve delivery of services. Suggested 
solutions were proposed with a major focus on the municipalities and their role within the 
sector. The overall structure of the report was an outline of three main challenges facing 
Norwegian health services followed by five preliminary suggested steps for meeting those 
challenges. The Parliament considered the report’s recommendations and followed up with 
relevant policy initiatives described in section 2.4.  
2.3.1 Challenges and Recommendations 
The three outlined challenges are: 
- Patients’ needs for coordinated services are not being sufficiently met. 
- In the services, there is too little initiative aimed at limiting and preventing disease. 
- Population development and the changing range of illnesses among the population. 
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The five suggested steps are: 
- A clearer role for the patient. 
- New role for municipalities in the future. 
- Financial incentives. 
- Developing the specialist health care services to enable them to apply their 
specialized competence to a greater extent. 
- Facilitating better-defined priorities. 
(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 2009) 
 
One of the challenges, ‘patients’ needs for coordinated services not being sufficiently met,’ 
along with two of the suggested steps, ‘financial incentives’ and a ‘new role for 
municipalities,’ are specifically related to the municipality’s responsibility for and 
involvement in health services required after hospitalization. As such, these sections of the 
reform are directly relevant to this study.  
The main goal of the coordination reform suggestions was to create economic incentives that 
support needed changes and provide a basis for excellent patient services and cost effective 
solutions. When the reform was introduced, it was asserted that the healthcare system did not 
sufficiently support continuity of patient care through collaboration between the 
municipalities and specialist health services, nor give an incentive to seek appropriate 
facilities and cooperation arrangements.   
2.3.2 Challenges  
This section highlights some of the important issues cited as motivation and justification for 
the five suggestions provided in the white paper. 
There were an estimated 150,000 hospital bed days utilized by elderly patients ready for 
discharge in 2007. One out of every five elderly patients was readmitted within 28 days of the 
original discharge and more than one out of four were readmitted within two months. New 
users of services saw a readmission rate of one in every three. According to the Coordination 
Reform paper, several Norwegian studies estimated that the number of unnecessary hospital 
admissions was significant with an overall estimate of about 400,000 somatic hospital days 
that could have been avoided if alternative services were available within the community. The 
report also estimated that the number of bed days for patients ready for discharge and 
unnecessarily hospitalized patients would increase from the (then) current 550,000, 
accounting for one in every seven hospital days to 900,000 by 2030, accounting for one out of 
every four to five bed days. It was indicated that this was a conservative estimate because it 
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assumed that the number of possible bed days in the hospitals was a constant factor and did 
not account for the rapid increase in hospital usage by the elderly in the previous decade.  
The report also presented data from the first eight months of 2008 showing that 19,000 stays, 
accounting for 145,000 bed days, were credited to patients who were ready for discharge. A 
survey in the autumn of 2008, among the regional health authorities, also estimated somatic 
bed days for patients ready for discharge to be 150,000. It was further concluded that the 
hospital length of stay (LOS) was directly affected by physician coverage in nursing homes, 
coverage levels of institutions, and number of homes for the elderly (over 80 yrs.). Smaller 
local hospitals and municipalities over 100,000 were associated with the greatest number of 
bed days for patients ready for discharge. It was noted, however, that there is wide variation 
among hospitals.  
At the time of the report, and as seen in section 1.1, the payment regulation was such that 
health authorities were able to request payment from the municipalities starting ten days after 
the municipality was notified in writing that a patient was ready for discharge unless another 
agreement was made (7 days in Oslo). 
Based on 2007 financial data from the health authorities and the hospitals, about 40 million 
kroner was spent on discharge ready patients. The average daily cost per hospital bed was 
5,000 NOK whereas the cost of an intermediate nursing home department was only 1,575 
NOK and only 1,100 NOK for a long-term nursing care bed. At the time of the report, there 
were no reliable KOSTRA (national information system with data on municipal and county 
authorities’ use of resources) figures for the net per day expenditures of municipal institutions 
for the elderly and disabled. The net operating costs, excluding capital costs in 2007 ranged 
from 1,100 to 1,800 NOK per day depending on the size and type of the nursing home. This 
being the case, the annual cost of bed days for discharge ready patients was 725 million NOK, 
based on average daily cost. If those days had been spent utilizing intermediate nursing home 
care units, using the average daily costs above, the annual cost would have been about 220 
million NOK. It is noteworthy that there is also a disclaimer given in the paper that the figures 
are estimates and therefore subject to uncertainty. 
The white paper referenced a letter, from the national board of health to the health ministry in 
December 2008, stating that resources were not sufficiently allocated for rehabilitation after 
treatment, nor was enough spent on needed home care after expensive rehabilitation programs 
were completed. A problem analysis was also referenced indicating there were few, if any, 
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systems in Norway that effectively distributed the tasks among the different health care 
sectors and between the entities within them. It went on to say, this, coupled with a lack of 
municipal management after patients were discharged, has resulted in the healthcare entities 
having different systems that are quite fragmented.  
Some of the services are provided in hospitals, not because they must be done there, but 
because the infrastructures have not been put in place that enable the municipalities to 
perform them, and/or because there is frequently either no cost or a reduced cost burden on 
the municipality to refer the patients to the hospital and let them be taken care of there.  
One of the assumptions for reducing the use of specialist care is that the municipality is able 
to facilitate and increase opportunities for timely discharge from hospital. 
2.3.3 Financial incentives  
The information in this section describes the financial incentives suggested in the 
coordination reform paper. 
The goals and rationalizations, presented in the Coordination Reform paper, were that the 
municipalities would be encouraged to look into ways to achieve better health outcomes either 
through better use of resources currently used or better use of new ones. This included more 
effective and efficient use of hospitals. In other words, the proposed incentive schemes were 
aimed at stimulating local involvement relating to the issue of coordination.  
Throughout their efforts, evaluating and proposing the coordination reform, the government 
paid special attention to the arrangement of financing systems and their effect on both the 
bodies that develop the services and the services themselves. The overall assessment was that 
the then current system was not conducive to the development of structures and organization 
of services that would adequately and appropriately provide for patients needs in a 
comprehensive manner. Nor did it provide for incentives to find cost-effective solutions. The 
ministry’s opinion was that the funding system was not structured well enough to sufficiently 
support effective collaboration between municipal healthcare related functions and specialist 
health services. 
The ministry believed that a stronger integration in funding was the best way to promote 
collaboration and integration and this could be best achieved by three main actions: 
introducing local co-financing of specialist healthcare services, transferring the financial 
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responsibility for discharge ready patients from the hospital to the municipalities, and a 
greater degree of block funding given to specialist healthcare services.  
The white paper outlined that the government would transfer the financial responsibility for 
discharge ready patients to the municipalities at the beginning of 2012, ultimately obligating 
them with payment for patients defined ready for discharge. The aim of the shifted financial 
obligations for patients ready for discharge was not to function as a punishment to the 
municipalities for not accepting them, but rather to implement an incentive to increase efforts 
to do so. With the introduction of the scheme, the municipal sector would be provided with 
funding that matched hospital costs for caring for patients who are ready for discharge. In 
principle, they could choose to continue or prolong the hospital stay of these patients, and 
incur the associated costs. Yet, with this new responsibility, the intention was a financial 
incentive to establish new or increase existing municipal services and entities that had 
operational costs lower than the daily fee that would have to be paid for patients ready for 
discharge. The funds saved, from utilizing lower cost facilities rather than paying for delayed 
patients, could then be used to further establish other health initiatives. 
The extra municipal funding would be financed by the regional health authorities (RHAs) 
experiencing a decrease in their allocation and the municipality’s receiving an increase based 
on historical data for costs associated with patients ready for discharge. This increase in 
funding would be allocated through funds from local taxes and non-earmarked block grants.  
In addition to the changes in payment regulations for discharge ready patients, the proposal 
suggested that before a patient can be defined as ready for discharge to primary care, all 
criteria of a discharge ready patient must be met. This arrangement was based on the 
assumption that the municipalities and hospitals would collaborate to develop criteria for 
discharge ready patients and agree on provisions for handling re-admissions. It was suggested 
that agreements concerning a reasonable time for discharge would have to be made 
concerning complex and challenging patient groups. Additionally, the discharge summary 
from the physician, drug information, prescriptions, and reports from all relevant professional 
bodies must be present at discharge. 
Again, it is important to note that the Coordination Reform paper highlighted that the ministry 
was aware of large differences between municipalities and institutions concerning discharge 
ready patients and factors that affect length of stay and discharge from hospital. Those factors 
being hospital location, number of nursing and care homes, physician coverage at nursing 
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homes, and staffing and expertise for nursing and home care. It was also indicated that this 
financial change would make the smaller municipalities the most vulnerable, but was 
suggested this could be minimized through inter-municipal cooperation.  
2.3.4 Municipal responsibility (New role for municipalities) 
This section references the changes in municipal responsibility proposed in the coordination 
reform paper. 
Two main changes in municipal responsibility were suggested by the Coordination Reform 
paper; municipal co-financing of specialist healthcare services and municipal financial 
responsibility for patients ready for discharge, the latter being relevant to this study.  
According to the Coordination Reform paper, it was theorized that many patients were likely 
treated within the wrong level of healthcare, especially certain care and treatment received in 
the hospitals which could be provided in a better and more cost effective manner within the 
communities. There were indications this might be due to structural deficiencies in the 
processing chain between hospitals and community health services, and as a result, waiting 
times between the hospitals and municipal care became too great.   
The paper pointed out that, often times, patients are classified as ready for discharge but 
remain in the hospital awaiting municipal services. There are also patients who, when 
considering their medical needs, unnecessarily wind up in the hospital because the 
municipalities do not have the infrastructure and facilities to meet their needs. It was 
estimated that in 2007, one out of every seven hospital beds was occupied by a patient who 
was deemed ready for discharge or who was unnecessarily hospitalized and could have been 
treated through community services. Accounting for an aging population, it is estimated that 
by the year 2030 one out of every four or five somatic hospital beds will be occupied by these 
same types of patients. Additionally, beyond an economic context, this also contributes to 
long waiting lists because those patients who need specialist services are being bed blocked 
by those patients utilizing hospital beds unnecessarily.  
A major consideration and suggestion of the reform paper for changes in municipal functions 
was to increase the number of, or improve existing municipal services that can treat patients 
before they require hospitalization or instead of hospitalization. Additionally, when 
hospitalization is required, increasing and improving services required after discharge to help 
minimize the overall period of hospitalization and waiting time once ready for discharge. This 
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included treatment and rehabilitation services, required after hospitalization, before patients 
are discharged home.  
According to the reform paper, studies show that discharge ready patients in the hospital will 
be able to get better and less costly services in the municipality. Furthermore, experience 
shows that establishing observation and post-treatment units within the municipal sector can 
help to improve the services for the individuals and help prevent hospitalizations and             
re-admissions. 
The proposal for ‘patients ready for discharge’ was believed to have many benefits. It would 
enable municipalities to make choices between paying for the patient to remain in the 
hospital, create other care opportunities and points of care in their own municipality, or 
develop inter-municipal agreements. The funds saved from utilizing lower cost facilities, 
rather than paying for patients with delayed discharges, could then be used to further establish 
other initiatives within the municipality. Increased efforts at the municipal level toward 
prevention, early intervention, and the right treatments at the appropriate time within the 
community, will help to reduce the need for hospital admissions and thus reduce the extent of 
delayed discharge patients. This change puts smaller communities at the greatest risk, 
especially in terms of the need for expertise, but again, it was believed that this could be 
remedied by inter-municipal cooperation schemes. 
2.4 New Policies 
In terms of this study, the most important policy changes resulting from the suggestions of the 
reform, outlined in section 2.3.1, are seen in the adoption of one new law and one new 
regulation concerning the municipal financial responsibility for patients ready for discharge; 
the Law on Municipal Health Services (Health and Care Act)- LOV-2011-06-24-30, and the 
Regulations on Municipal Co-funding of Specialist and Municipal Payments for Patients 
Ready for Discharge-FOR-2011-11-18-1115 (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care 
Services 2011b, a).The most important subsections of those laws are the following: 
LOV-2011-06-24-30; § 11-4 Municipal financing responsibility for discharge ready 
patients  
The municipality must, from day one, cover the expenses for patients who are ready to 
be discharged but who remain in a private or public institution providing specialist 
health services in anticipation of municipal healthcare services.  
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The municipality must enter into a cooperation agreement with the regional health 
authorities for discharge ready patients.  
The Ministry may issue further regulations on the scheme's scope and content of the 
criteria for when a patient is ready to be discharged, including criteria for cooperation 
between local and specialist health services on discharge ready patients. They will also 
determine the daily pay rates referenced in the first paragraph and which municipality 
is responsible for the expenses of discharge ready patients. (2011b) 
FOR-2011-11-18-1115; Chapter 3-Government payment for discharge ready 
patients 
 
§ 7 Assessment of a patient admitted to hospital 
When a patient is admitted to the hospital, the health personnel in the hospital must do 
an assessment of whether the patient may need care from municipal healthcare 
services after discharge from the hospital. 
§ 8 Notification to the municipality for hospitalized patient 
If the assessment in § 7 shows that the patient may require help from municipal health 
care services after discharge, the hospital should notify the municipality of this within 
24 hours of admission. If the assessment indicates that the patient is not in need of 
assistance after discharge, but this changes during the hospital stay, the 24 hour period 
begins from the date it is determined that such a need exists. 
Notification must include:  
a) patient's status 
b) the estimated progress 
c) the expected discharge date 
If there will be a need for extensive or prolonged hospital treatment, or if because of 
the patient's health condition it is not possible to make assessments, pursuant to the 
second paragraph, within 24 hours after admission, the assessment should be 
performed and the municipality notified as soon as possible. 
The hospital must notify the municipality if there are changes in the expected 
discharge date or care needs. 
§ 9 Conditions for a patient to be discharge ready 
A patient is discharge ready when a doctor in the hospital considers that there is no 
need for further specialist treatment. This decision is based on an individual health 
assessment, and the following points must be considered and documented in the 
medical record: 
a) issue(s) at admission, as indicated by the admitting physician, should be clarified 
b) other issues which have emerged should be clarified 
c) if certain issues are not resolved, they must be explained 
d) an update about the diagnosis, and a plan for patient follow-up 
e) the patient's overall functioning, changes from prior to admission, and expected 
future developments should be indicated 
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§ 10 Notification of the municipality for discharge ready patient 
When a patient is defined as discharge ready, see § 9, the hospital must notify the 
municipality immediately. This does not apply to patients ready for discharge who do 
not require municipal health services. 
§ 11 Message to the hospital when the municipality can receive patient 
The municipality must, after receiving notice of a discharge ready patient, see § 10, 
immediately notify the hospital if they can accept the patient. This does not apply if 
there are circumstances beyond the municipality's control that prevent this. 
 
If the municipality cannot accept the patient, the hospital must be notified when a 
municipal service is expected to be ready. The municipality must immediately notify 
the hospital when services are ready for the patient. 
§ 12 Transfer of discharge ready patient from the hospital to the municipality 
The hospital may transfer a discharge ready patient when the municipality has 
confirmed that a municipal service for the patient is ready. 
Upon discharge from the hospital, discharge summaries or equivalent information 
must be sent to health personnel who need the information to provide appropriate 
patient monitoring, see § 9. 
§ 13 Payment for discharge ready hospital patients anticipating municipal services 
The municipality must pay for hospitalized discharge ready patients anticipating 
municipal healthcare services. 
Payment obligation arises from the day the patient is declared ready for discharge if 
conditions from § 8 to § 10 are met, and the municipality has stated that it cannot 
accept the patient. Payment obligation is also triggered if the municipality has not 
responded to the notification pursuant to § 10 for discharge ready patients. 
The hospital should report that a patient is ready for discharge to Norwegian Patient 
Register when the conditions in the previous paragraph are met. 
The daily rate for stays of discharge ready patients in hospitals is determined in the 
state budget. 
§ 14 Demand of report 
The municipality may request a statement of the considerations the hospital has 
conducted pursuant to § 9. The report must contain sufficient and necessary 
information so that the municipality can verify the judgments made by the hospital. 
 
The normal rules of confidentiality apply for disclosure of information in the previous 
paragraph. 
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§ 15 The financial settlement 
The regional health authorities must ensure that the bill is sent to the municipality for 
the payment of discharge ready patients who have been in the hospital pending a 
municipal service, see § 13. (2011a) 
2.4.1 Policy Implications 
An expense of 4000 Norwegian Kroner (NOK), paid by the municipalities to the hospital for 
each day a patient stays in the hospital after being declared ready for discharge (delayed 
discharge), is the primary financial effect of the above provisions. To cover these and the co-
financing of specialist care costs, 5.6 billion NOK was given to the municipality from the 
national government in 2012. Figure 5 shows the changes in funding resulting from the policy 
reform for coverage of these costs as described in chapter 1 and section 2.3.3.  
 
Figure 5. Changes in funding from 2011 to 2012 
 (Source: Hanssen, Norwegian Directorate of Health 2012)  
The changes that have occurred, as a result of the new policies, extend beyond the 4000 NOK 
daily fee. Mandated intricacies making discharge planning an extensive process that begins 
within 24 hours of admission are now also in place. The new procedures aim to ensure 
communication between the hospitals and city districts for patients who are in need of 
municipal services after discharge from the hospital. An additional aim was establishing a 
minimum of necessary information to be exchanged between the hospitals and districts when 
patients are admitted to the hospital, during their episode of care, and at time of discharge.   
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Prior to 2012 and these new mandates, there were no regulations addressing or mandating 
minimum protocol leading up to the point when a patient was deemed ready for discharge. 
Therefore, according to the Coordination Reform paper, very often, counties without a 
cooperation contract with the hospitals did not plan for reception of a patient before they 
received information about the date of discharge. This was especially true for the counties 
which host hospitals, as they used this method to maximize the use of the hospitals’ bed 
capacity. 
One of the specifically outlined mandates, existing prior to the new regulations, was the 
criteria for what must be evaluated and documented in the patient’s medical record in order to 
be defined as ready for discharge. These criteria were first introduced in a 1998 regulation for 
municipal payment for patients who have finished treatment and are listed as follows: 
1. issue(s) that were identified by the admitting physician at admission should be              
clarified 
2. other issues that have emerged should be clarified 
3. for issues that are not resolved, they must be explained 
4. an update about the final diagnosis, and a plan for patient follow-up 
5. the patient's overall level of functioning, any changes from prior to admission, and 
expected future developments should be indicated 
6. if the patient requires specialist healthcare services which are outside the current 
department's responsibility, it must be ensured that the relevant contact is established, 
and the plan for follow-up described.  
(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services 1998) 
These criteria continued as mandates through the 2003 update and remain in the current 
regulation, with the exception of number 6, which is no longer listed. The other regulation, in 
existence prior to 2012, was the number of days before payment could be required after a 
patient was ready for discharge: 14 days, introduced in 1999 and later changed to ten days 
(seven for Oslo) in 2003 (1998, 2002).  All other national mandates are new as of the 
beginning of 2012 and described below.  
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Figure 6.  Patient process period from admission to discharge effective January 1, 2012  
 
The hospitalization process has three main stages: an admission, an inpatient period and a 
final stage with the discharge process (Ortiga et al. 2012). Below is a detailed explanation of 
those events depicted in Figure 6. The examples given for specific times of day and the 
mediums used for notification apply specifically to OUS, but the other hospital protocols are 
very similar if not the same.  
Notification of admitted patient 
For all patients who are expected to require post-discharge municipal services, the hospital 
has the responsibility to notify the district/municipality no later than 24 hours after the patient 
is admitted or as soon as it has been determined that the patient will require municipal 
services. This notification must include the expected municipal services that will be required 
at time of discharge. The notification should also contain the following information: patient 
status, expected progress and expected discharge date. If the initial assessment of the patient 
indicates that municipal assistance after discharge will not be necessary, but this changes 
during hospitalization, the 24 hour time limit starts from the point when it is determined that 
such a need will be required at discharge and the normal procedure is followed. There is an 
exception for patients who have a permanent place in a nursing home or residential care with 
day services. In these cases, the notification process does not follow the same routine.  
It is also worth mentioning that I have not found a regulation or rule addressing the 
circumstances if this 24 hour time limit is violated.  
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*Different hospitals and districts (within Oslo) require different notification mediums. Ahus, 
Diakonhjemmet and Lovisenberg use electronic notifications, whereas all others use fax.    
Response 1 from district 
Within 24 hours after receiving notification of admission of a patient who will require 
additional services, the district should respond to the patient's department. The response must 
contain the following: confirmation that the initial admission and likely need for municipal 
services notification was received, a briefing about what municipal services the patient had 
before admission, a description of the patient’s level of functioning and any challenges 
experienced in the home.  
Notification of changed discharge time/functioning level  
The hospital is required to notify the district if either the expected discharge date or the 
patient’s level of functioning changes. Additionally, the hospital must inform the district if the 
need for municipal services no longer exists, if the patient is transferred to another institution 
or department, or if there is a patient death. 
Notification of the district/municipality for discharge ready patients  
The hospital should send a written notice to the district when a patient is defined as discharge 
ready and a discharge time has been set. The discharging physician is required to document 
the following for patients who are being discharged: 
 What issues/diagnoses the patient was admitted with 
 If there are other issues encountered during the stay 
 If the described issues are resolved or not 
 An explanation for any unresolved issues  
 The patient's discharge diagnosis and overall level of functioning 
 Assessment of expected future developments and plans for follow-up 
 Needs/plan for referral to other specialists 
 Other issues/needs for rapid follow-up by a GP 
 
The date when the patient is discharged ready should also be clearly stated. 
The deadline for notification 
As a general rule, notifications of discharge ready patients should be sent as early as possible. 
The responsible parties should try to notify the municipality as early as possible on the day 
before the patient will be ready for discharge, preferably before 14:30 Monday to Friday and 
the last working day before any holidays. If the patient has a need for new or changed services 
and is reported discharge ready on a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday, and this is not 
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known or reported to the municipality/district before 14:30 on a Friday or the last working 
day before a holiday, the municipality/district is not committed to providing feedback on the 
discharge or to receiving the patient until the next business day.  
Discharge to an unchanged level of care with stay less than 48 hours  
For stays shorter than 24 hours and admissions and discharges during the weekend, telephone 
calls are used for communicating the time of discharge and follow-up requirements, provided 
that the patient's care needs have not changed significantly from pre-admission. When the 
discharge time is determined, the municipal/district is notified. An effort should be made to 
conduct discharges during the day and be arranged in coordination with the 
municipality/district.  
If a patient is admitted to the hospital from a municipal short-term, rehabilitation or 
intermediate service, they may be discharged back to that institution within 48 hours of being 
admitted, if the required documentation from the discharging physician is complete. The 
discharge arrangements are made between the hospital and the institution from which the 
patient was admitted. If the hospital expects that the stay will last more than 48 hours at the 
time of admission, the normal procedure is followed.  
Discharge for new or changed care level  
If a previously announced discharge is moved up, the municipality should be notified no later 
than the 14:30 the day before discharge. The municipality shall be notified immediately if a 
discharge is postponed. The hospital cannot discharge a discharge ready patient before the 
municipality/district has confirmed their acceptance. The hospital must prescribe any 
necessary patient transport and strive, as much as possible, to see that patients arrive to their 
destination before 18:00 (14:00 on weekends). If arriving after 18:00, the hospital must call 
the nursing home/home care to clarify they will receive the patient before transport starts. 
Response 2 from district “Received notice of discharge ready patient”  
Immediately after receiving notification of a discharge ready patient, the district should 
contact the hospital by phone. The phone call acts as a confirmation that the district can 
receive the patient on the discharge ready date. If the district cannot receive the patient on that 
date, the date when the district can receive the patient must be given. The hospital should 
provide the district with relevant information related to the discharge and possible measures to 
prevent re-admission.  
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3. THEORY 
The shift in financial responsibility and changes in funding noted in chapter 2 can be used to 
make predictions about the changes I will likely see in the data. These predictions can be 
developed through understanding the relationships among needs and supply and demand. 
Additionally, shifts in relative costs/price can dictate municipal decision-making for accepting 
patients and patient characteristics and status affect the hospitals’ decisions to deem patients 
ready for discharge.    
3.1 Needs and demand 
The needs of individuals are the main starting points for assessing the overall need for health 
services, including the need to stay in the hospital. Due to the subjective nature of what 
defines a need, this can be difficult to quantify. Individual need is commonly associated with 
health status and current medical technology determining people’s capacity/ability to utilize 
health services (Sutton et al, 2002; cited in NOU 2008:2).  Health status and one’s ability to 
benefit from health services will also vary due to factors such as age and socioeconomic 
status. Figure 7 provides a schematic representation of the relationship between health, 
socioeconomic status, need, supply and demand of healthcare services.  
Health Status
Socioeconomic 
characteristics 
including age 
and gender
Need 
(unobserved)
Consumption of 
healthcare 
services
Supply side 
characteristics
 
Figure 7. The relationship between health status, socioeconomic characteristics, need, 
supply and consumption of healthcare services (adapted from (NOU 2008:2)) 
 
A need for healthcare results from injury, disease or illness and thus, a change in health status 
is an underlying variable for healthcare needs. Socioeconomic factors including age and 
gender can affect the need for healthcare either indirectly by impacting health status, or 
directly by personal characteristics such as old age. At the same time, need can help explain 
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the consumption of health care, including hospital care and length of stay in hospitals. Need is 
a factor that can create demand for services and when demand is greater than supply, 
consumption is restricted to the level of supply. On the other hand, if there are no supply side 
restrictions, consumption will characterize need. Determinates of supply can also affect need 
which, in turn, has an effect on consumption. Need and demand can be reduced by providing 
curative and preventive services, yet new technological advances can create new, previously 
unrealized demand (NOU 2008:2). It should also be noted, potentials for social consumption 
of healthcare and defensive medicine occur when treatment or evaluations are provided even 
though they are technically not medically necessary. A simplified expression of the 
relationship between the factors is as follows (NOU 2008:2): 
Need = demand, if no restrictions in supply and perfect information 
Demand = consumption, if supply is greater than demand 
Based on these relationships, differences in expected individual needs can be explained by 
differences in individual characteristics such as age, sex and social factors. These 
demographic characteristics can then be used as the basis for allocation of public funding. The 
resources allocated for publically funded goods, such as health care in Norway, is not 
unlimited and must be distributed among many entities. Basic microeconomic theory can be 
applied to explain this healthcare situation. Due to the demographic and geographic 
differences in Norway even at the municipal district level, the age and socioeconomic 
structures can vary greatly. Each municipal government is responsible for providing public 
goods that are funded through block grants from the national government and allocated based 
on local individual demographic characteristics (Johnsen 2006, 47).  Furthermore, budget 
constraints are used as a regulatory tool and they create supply side restrictions which can 
translate to limitations in consumption. In theory, with a constrained budget, the healthcare 
sector would strive for maximum patient utility within those constraints.  
3.2 Shift in responsibility and the effects on length of stay 
With the new transfer of responsibility from the hospitals to the municipalities and subsequent 
changes in funding, the municipalities have to find a balance within their budget constraints. 
We can understand how the municipalities/districts adapt to these shifts in relative 
costs/prices within a basic demand framework. The legal responsibility for providing public 
healthcare services within a municipality is shared between two levels; primary care services 
provided by the municipality and hospital/specialist care provided by the hospital trusts under 
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direction of the regional health authorities  (NOU 2005:3). The municipalities have a budget 
to cover healthcare costs, whether they are hospital services or their own primary care 
services. Prior to the implemented reforms, the price paid by the municipalities for hospital 
care was effectively zero until seven days after a patient was identified as discharge ready. 
These patient costs were covered by the hospitals whose funding is allocated in the regional 
health authorities’ budgets.  Therefore, having no effect on the municipal healthcare budgets, 
there was a financial incentive for the municipalities to let the hospitals cover the costs for 
patients ready for discharge or lack of an incentive to begin covering those costs. Beginning 
in 2012, the costs for hospital care was transferred to the municipalities, beginning when a 
patient was declared ready for discharge. Even though the actual costs of providing municipal 
primary care services stay the same, the relative costs of those services become cheaper as the 
relative hospital care costs have increased. In theory, this should translate to a shift of care 
within the municipalities; decreasing utilization of hospital care and an increase in use of their 
own services. In turn, this results in my main hypothesis, that there will be a reduction in 
overall delayed discharge.   
In addition to the endeavor to find a balance in services between the hospitals and 
municipalities due to budget constraints, decisions made during the process outlined in Figure 
6 in the previous chapter have an additional effect on delays in patient discharges. The final 
decisions that are made before a patient can be discharged from the hospital and sent to 
municipal services involve a two-step process that is a complex, collaborative effort between 
the hospitals and the districts. The initial step is taken by the hospitals in setting a planned 
discharge date, when they feel the patient no longer requires hospital services. This step is 
followed by the city districts deciding the actual date of discharge based on their 
willingness/ability to accept and provide services. Ideally, these two dates would be identical 
and delayed discharges would be nonexistent, but often this is not the case. Many times, there 
are differences between the two dates (steps) in this process, and this time difference forms 
the basis of this analysis. The time difference is dependent upon variable factors that affect 
and influence the choices and decisions made in both steps of the process; the hospitals’ 
expected discharge date, and the date the city district actually accepts the patient (the date the 
patient is discharged).    
The decision made by the hospitals, setting an anticipated discharge date, is dependent on 
multiple elements such as the characteristics (ex. age, gender) and status of the patient (ex. 
diagnosis, comorbidities). The districts’ decision, dictating the actual discharge date, is also 
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influenced by multiple factors including patient characteristics, restrictions set by the 
resources they have at their disposal (ex. budget for nursing care) and the amount of services 
being utilized by other patients (ex. population over 80). Based on these factors that shape 
decision making between these parties just prior to patient discharges, I am able to make a 
prediction that hospitals with differing concentrations of patients with specific diagnoses and 
comorbidities, as well as those districts with less resource restrictions (greater nursing care 
spending) and smaller proportions of populations over 80 years will have less delays in their 
discharges when controlling for patient characteristics (age and gender).  
Limitations of the data restrict my ability to fully evaluate all elements of these hypotheses, 
but this will be returned to more carefully in the discussion chapter.   
3.3 Testable Predictions 
This section serves as a summary of the testable predictions about the data that I am able to 
make based on the information found in this chapter. Due to a shift in relative costs, my main 
prediction is that there will be a reduction in the overall delayed discharge days, resulting 
from the city districts decreasing their utilization of hospital care and increasing use of their 
own services. I also predict that those districts with less resource restrictions (greater nursing 
care spending) and smaller proportions of  elderly inhabitants will have less delays in their 
discharges when controlling for patient characteristics (age and gender). Again, predictions 
pertaining to the hospitals are not testable due to data restrictions, and will be outlined in the 
discussion chapter. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLGY 
Because the implementation and effects of the Coordination Reform are ongoing, some even 
unrealized, there have been no studies to date that analyze the effects of the new municipal 
responsibility for patients ready for discharge. At the beginning of 2011, all 15 districts within 
the municipality of Oslo began to register individual discharge information (when patients 
were deemed ready for discharge and the time of discharge) in the already existing Gerica 
database. The makeup of the Gerica data does not allow me to look at the entire stay from 
admission to discharge. However, the new provisions and the notification within 24 hours of 
admission requirement, allows me to make an initial assessment explaining the likely errors 
and variations in the physicians’ and hospitals’ ability to accurately predict or estimate a 
patient’s discharge. These predictions and estimations made by the physicians and hospitals 
ultimately enable the municipality sufficient preparatory time so they may accept the patient 
on, or close to, the day they are ready for discharge. This project is the first to use individual 
level municipal discharge data to evaluate effects of the municipal financial responsibility for 
patients ready for discharge in Oslo. 
Victor et al. have identified and classified risk factors and factors associated with delayed 
discharge into a theoretical model of predisposing factors (such as age), enabling factors (such 
as the availability of social support), vulnerability factors (dependency and co-morbidity), and 
organizational/administrative factors (referral for services, type of team undertaking 
assessments) (2000). This framework can be used to organize different risk factors that 
influence the findings that are relevant to this study. I am able to look at age, gender, city 
district, hospital and the type of location to which patients are being discharged, and the 
relationship they have to the days between ready for discharge notification and actual 
discharge and the days from discharge deadline to actual discharge, as well as, the hospitals’ 
success in predictive discharge planning. I can then take this analysis a step further and 
evaluate, at the city district level, if the immigrant population proportion, spending on nursing 
care (indicating the amount of nursing staff) and/or proportion of elderly in the population can 
further explain the initially evaluated relationships.   
4.1 Study Design 
This study is a register based retrospective cohort study at the municipal district level in Oslo 
between 2011 and 2012. The design captures variation over time, as well as demographic and 
geographic variation. In the analyses, I will analyze the main variable that describes the 
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period from when a patient is ready for discharge and actual discharge within the municipality 
of Oslo, which I will call ‘delayed discharge days.’ I will also describe the period from 
discharge deadline to actual discharge as another variable, which I will call ‘days from 
deadline.’ In an attempt to account for differences in regulations and definitions, an analysis 
of a variable for payment days (‘payment days’) will be performed. I use each of the 
calculated time periods (‘delayed discharge days,’ ‘days from deadline’ and ‘payment days’) 
as dependent variables in a direct-entry multivariate-least-squares regression analysis along 
with relevant independent variables explaining potential influencing factors. These 
independent variables are demographic and geographic influencing factors that include 
variables such as age, gender, the 15 city districts of Oslo, the 5 main Oslo hospitals, and 
types of locations to which patients are sent after discharge. I then look at immigration and 
spending on nursing care as an indicator of nursing staff at the individual district level to 
explain the initial observations. Additionally, population proportion over 80 years of age will 
also be analyzed as a demand variable.  
The discharges were selected and categorized by year based on the year that the discharge 
notification was given rather than the year of discharge. This is relevant for those discharge 
notifications that were given at the end of a calendar and then the discharge took place in the 
following year.    
4.2 Data and limitations 
The primary health services within the city districts of Oslo use a computer based 
documentation system called Gerica which contains demographic information, use and costs 
of primary health care, time when patients are considered ready for discharge and time of 
actual discharge. The data found in the registry that can be effectively used for evaluations 
includes age, gender, hospital, city district, type of location to which a patient was discharged, 
if a patient died before discharge and if a patient died within seven days of discharge, as well 
as the date ready for discharge, discharge deadline and date of actual discharge. 
Unfortunately, Gerica does not include the data of admission which would be ideal for 
evaluating the entire length of stay and admission to discharge process. Gerica does include a 
date when the initial notification of admission within the first 24 hours took place, but it is my 
understanding that even though there was some reporting in 2011 it only started on a wide 
scale at the beginning of 2012 and the reporting was and is lacking and not heavily enforced. 
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The reporting is supposed to be continually improving, but due to this lack of reliability this 
information is not suitable for inclusion in an analysis.  
The other source of data is Statistics Norway, which is the central Norwegian statistics 
bureau. This database contains extensive information on a multitude of subject areas, but 
important to this study are statistics on population, spending on home care and non-hospital, 
institutional nursing and percentages of immigrants all stratified by city district.      
Limitations of data include concerns about reliability and accuracy, as well as confounding 
and bias. The nature of the study design, the time frame and comparability problems due to 
varied users responsible for data entry are also likely limitations. These and other issues will 
be returned to more carefully and in more detail in the discussion of the results.  
Since this thesis does not contain identifiable individual level data it was not reported to 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). General ethical guidelines were still applied 
throughout the research process. 
4.2.1 Ensuring data quality  
Numerous steps were taken to ensure the quality and accuracy of the data beginning in the 
first quarter of 2012. Data previously collected was checked and as new data was collected 
each month the process continued. According to Heywood and Rohde, visual scanning is the 
most effective way to ensure correctness, completeness and consistency of reported data 
(2002, 43). The data was visually checked for missing values, incorrect or out-of-range 
values, and entries that were logically inconsistent. Completely accurate data is optimal, but 
in reality, this is highly unlikely. The datasets were carefully reviewed to check for 
unexpected discrepancies. The most common errors discovered in the data were the result of 
manual entry input; duplicate entries, missing data and logically inconsistent or improbable 
entries. As these errors were discovered, they were compiled into queries and then reviewed 
individually in the Gerica interface. If a determination could be made by looking at each case 
in the Gerica interface, the corrections were made, if not, those unresolved cases were sent to 
the districts for review. Before being sent to the districts for review, errors were handled in 
the following ways. If a duplicate entry was an exact copy of another entry, one was deleted, 
if there were any differences, Gerica was checked for the accurate entry to retain. Missing 
data was handled by looking for the information in Gerica, if it could not be found the 
districts were consulted, and if that failed, the entry was disregarded. Inconsistencies and 
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improbabilities were checked and if a remedy for the error could be explained with a high 
degree of certainty, it was manually changed. For example, if a patient was discharge ready 
on a certain date in 2011 and their discharge date was one relatively close, but the year was 
2001, there is a high degree of certainty it was a manual entry error. Another example would 
be if a patient was discharged a month before they were discharge ready, by looking at other 
information in the file, the correct month could be changed with a pretty high degree of 
certainty. 
4.2.2 Study Population 
All residents that were admitted to a hospital for somatic care and received/applied for 
municipal primary healthcare upon being discharged between 01.01.2011-31.12.2012 in Oslo 
(somatic patients registered in Gerica), who had ready for discharge notification, discharge 
deadline, and discharge dates, were included in this study. 
4.3 Empirical model  
Correlation and effects of independent variables on the dependent variable are best 
investigated and analyzed via multivariate regression analyses (Newbold, Carlson, and 
Thorne 2010, 504-509). Dependent variables are explained by the inclusion of independent 
variables. Multivariate regression estimates the effect of an independent X-variable on a 
dependent Y, while controlling for the effects of the other X-variables.  
The general empirical model linear equation for multivariate regression is characterized by 
the following:  
                             
Y represents the dependent continuous variable that is being predicted. β0 is the constant 
representing the regression intercept and is equal to Y when X is zero. The Betas (βx) 
represent the coefficients for their corresponding explanatory variables (Xx). The Beta 
coefficients measure the effect the changes in the independent variables (X) have on the 
expected value of the dependent variable (Y) when all other variables are controlled for as 
constants. εi represents the residuals or the difference between the predicted and observed 
value for Y.  
4.4 Variables  
A patient’s length of stay after being deemed ready for discharge (delayed discharge), which 
often leads to bed blocking, can be influenced and affected by, but not limited to the 
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following: the hospital in which they receive care, the city district responsible for their 
primary care services, and what type of service location to which they are discharged. 
Additionally, the number of nursing home and home care nurses, the number of immigrants 
and elderly populations in their respective city district, can help to explain the locational and 
geographic differences. Other independent variables that were expected to influence discharge 
time such as age and gender were analyzed.  
4.4.1 Dependent variables  
The main dependent variable describes the number of days between when the municipality is 
notified by the hospital that a patient is ready for discharge and the actual date of discharge 
(delayed discharge days). Another similar secondary dependent variable is the length of time, 
also in days, between the discharge deadline date and the actual date of discharge (days from 
deadline), but due to changes in definition and regulations, this variable is difficult to analyze 
and will therefore be given less emphasis. As presented in section 1.1, in 2011, the deadline 
for discharge throughout Norway was 10 days (7 days in the municipality of Oslo) after a 
patient was deemed ready for discharge. With the new reform effective January 1, 2012, the 
deadline date is the same day the patient is ready for discharge. Exceptions and intricacies are 
documented in section 2.3.3. In order to give a more complete picture, in light of the 
definition and regulation changes, a third variable, also with less emphasis, measuring the 
number of days past the discharge deadline date (payment days), calculated for only those 
discharges that exceeded the deadline for 2011 and 2012 by removing those who were 
discharged on or before the deadline will be analyzed. This accounts or adjusts for those 
discharges that could have negative days between discharge and deadline and looks at only 
those who could require payment. These dependent variables specifically pertain to 
discharges for somatic care patients requiring municipal services within the municipality of 
Oslo. These periods of time were used to form continuous variables of delayed discharge 
days, days from deadline and payment days. In addition to being evaluated independently, the 
differences between years, 2011 and 2012, were analyzed. Again, the main focus of the 
regression analysis will be for ‘delayed discharge days’ due to issues with changes in payment 
regulations and time period definitions. A timeline referencing the periods described above, 
with the exception of the 2011 discharge deadline, can be found on page 24 (Figure 6).    
36 
 
4.4.2 Independent variables  
The independent variables used in the analyses account for potential explanations of factors 
that could influence the dependent variables’ lengths of time. These factors are selected to 
represent variables that were outlined in Figure 7 found in chapter 3, page 27. A description 
and results of the variation in these variables will be evaluated using regression analysis and 
addressed in the results chapter. 
Need/Demand  
Age and gender were included in the regression analysis to represent the socioeconomic 
characteristics that influence need/demand found in the relationship model depicted in Figure 
7. Need/demand for services within the districts is also represented by the percentage of 
elderly inhabitants over 80 years of age and the immigrant population percentage.   
Gender 
Gender is included in the regression model as an individual case level independent variable 
found in chapter 5. This variable was coded as a dummy variable of 1 for females and 0 for 
males and acted to analyze if there are any differences in the time periods with relation to 
gender.  
Age 
Age was included in the regression as an individual case level independent variable coded 
into eight dummy categories. The categories were grouped in the following fashion: 0-17 
years, 18-49 years, 50-66 years, 67-74 years, 75-79 years, 80-84 years, 85-89 years and 90-
200 years. This acted to analyze if there are any differences in the time periods with relation 
to the ages of the discharged patients. In the regressions found in chapter 5, patient age groups 
are dummy variables given a value 1 for their respective age group and value 0 for all others. 
Elderly and Immigrants 
Additional variables were included in an extended regression as continuous independent 
variables in hopes of shedding more light on the results of the initial statistics by looking at 
need/demand from chapter 3. The percentage of immigrants from Africa, Asia, Turkey and 
South and Central America and the percentage of inhabitants over the age of 80 years in the 
population of each city district were used to explain the differences noted from previous 
regressions.  The percentages of immigrants and inhabitants over the age of 80, broken down 
by city district, were obtained directly from statistics Norway. These were used as continuous 
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variables in the regression models found in the results chapter and served as proxies for the 
city district variables.   
Supply  
Hospital, city district, location type to which patients were sent upon being discharged and 
spending on nursing care were included in the evaluations to aid in explaining variations in 
supply side characteristics as displayed in Figure 7. 
Hospital 
Hospitals were included in the regression model as independent variables coded into six 
dummy categories. Four for the four main hospitals in the municipality of Oslo: OUS Aker, 
Diakonhjemmet, Lovisenberg sykehus and Ullevål, one for Akershus universitetssykehus 
which covers three districts, as seen in section 2.2, and another single category for all other 
hospitals. This acted to analyze if there are any differences in the time periods with relation to 
the hospital the patient was discharged from. In the regressions found in chapter 5, hospitals 
are dummy variables given a value 1 for their respective hospital and value 0 for all others.  
City District 
The 15 city districts of Oslo: Gamle Oslo, Grünerløkka, Sagene, St. Hanshaugen, Frogner, 
Ullern, Vestre Aker, Nordre Aker, Bjerke, Grorud, Stovner, Alna, Østensjø, Norstrand and 
Søndre Norstrand were included in the regression model as independent variables coded as 
dummy variables. This acted to analyze if there are any differences in the time periods with 
relation to city district. In the regressions found in chapter 5, city districts are dummy 
variables given a value 1 for their respective district and value 0 for all others.  
Discharged to 
The locations where patients were sent upon being discharged were independent variables in 
the regression model coded into eight dummy categories including one category, Annet 
(others), encompassing all those that did not fit into one of the defined seven. The seven 
categories were hjemme (home), korttidopphold (short-term stay), korttid samhandling (short-
time coordination), korttid intermediær (short-intermediate), korttid rehabilitering (short-term 
rehabilitation), korttid vurderingsplass (short-term evaluation place), and langtidsopphold 
(long-term stay). This acted to analyze if there are any differences in the time periods with 
relation to the type of location a patient was sent to upon being discharged. In the regressions 
found in chapter 5, the locations patients were sent to upon discharge are dummy variables 
given a value 1 for their respective location and value 0 for all others.  
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Spending on nursing care 
Just as the immigrant and elderly population percentages served as proxies for the districts to 
help explain need/demand characteristics, the amount of capital (in 1000 NOK) spent per 
person on combined non-hospital institutional and home care nursing was used to explain the 
differences found in previous regressions. A variable for nursing coverage was derived from 
obtaining the figures for the amount of capital spent on nursing for each district based on 
nursing type and then dividing by the district’s population. Since the spending numbers for 
2012 are not yet available, yet unlikely to significantly change from 2011, the 2011 figures 
were used and divided by the 2012 population numbers. These figures are an indicator for the 
number of personnel because 80% of spending on nursing care is allocated to human 
resources. This variable was also a continuous variable in the regression models found in the 
results chapter.   
4.5 Analyses 
Descriptive statistics and measures of central tendency were used broadly to describe the 
dataset. T-tests were used to evaluate the time differences between 2011 and 2012 broadly, as 
well as stratifying by each independent explanatory variable.   
Multivariate linear regression was then employed for the predictive analysis portion of this 
study to analyze continuous time variables related to delayed discharge with independent 
demographic and geographic variables, as well as other possible risk factors to measure any 
associations. In addition, I included variables describing supply and demand of healthcare 
services within the city districts. The models contain one continuous dependent variable and 
multiple independent variables used to estimate a dependent variable value. By its nature, 
multivariate regression allowed me to explore interrelationships among the variables using 
their respective correlations.  
Descriptive functions, t-tests and multivariate least squares regression in Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 19.0 for Microsoft Windows were used to perform each 
analysis. 
4.6 Assumptions 
Like any statistical application, certain assumptions must be accounted for to help validate the 
findings and conclusions in multiple regressions. The assumption of normally distributed 
residuals applies when working with small datasets. Regardless of which variable is being 
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analyzed or if the two years are taken individually or separately, the dataset contains over 
5,000 cases corresponding to individual patient discharges. A sample of this size is 
sufficiently large enough to ensure normality, generalizability and validity of the data.  
Information in this section will include skewness, kurtosis, multicollinearity, auto-collinearity 
and heteroscedasticity. 
Values for skewness and kurtosis are used to evaluate how normal the distribution of data is, 
also known as normality. Skewness indicates how symmetrical the distribution of the data is, 
whereas kurtosis indicates the distributional “peakedness.” For perfect normally distributed 
data both values equal zero.  If the data is clustered towards the left, at lower values, the 
skewness values will be positive, and the opposite is true for negative skewness values where 
the values will be clustered on the right side of the graph or at higher values. If the data is 
highly peaked with many values clustered in the center with thin tails, the kurtosis values will 
be positive. Data with excessive extreme values will have negative kurtosis values and be 
relatively flat. Due to the very large size of the dataset used in this analysis, skewness and 
kurtosis do not exhibit a major effect. (Pallant 2011) 
The dependent variables in each model all deviate from the normal distribution curve to 
varying degrees. The time from discharge notification to actual discharge, when taken with 
2011 and 2012 combined had a skewness statistic of 6.19 and when taken from each year 
individually 6.69 and 9.29 in 2011 and 2012 respectively (See Appendix I). The three 
corresponding kurtosis values in the same respective order were 131.21, 133.57, and 176.94. 
The 2011 and 2012 combined skewness and kurtosis values for the other dependent variable 
of time from discharge deadline and actual discharge are 3.04 and 57.89 respectively. The two 
years taken individually had values of 2.20 and 24.09 for 2011 and 8.81 and 184.66 for 2012. 
Based on those numbers, the residuals of both descriptive variables have positively skewed 
and highly peaked distribution curves. Due to the data set containing the value 0 when the 
discharge deadline was met and negative values in 2011 if the discharge took place before the 
deadline (the theoretical goal of the municipality), many scores are clustered at and around the 
center of the curve. These non-normal values for symmetry and distribution do not affect the 
results of the analysis due to the very large sample size. This is explained by the central limit 
theorem, where the larger the sample size, the more normal the distribution becomes. This 
minimizes the risk of type I and type II errors. Therefore, even with the observed skewed 
residuals and pointedness, the distribution of the coefficients should be approximately normal 
(Newbold, Carlson, and Thorne 2010, 274-280).  
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To account for potential bias and correlation between the variables, multicollinearity 
(influence between variables) and auto-collinearity (influence between residuals) diagnostics 
were performed.  
Pearson correlations were performed to check for multicollinearity and give indications as to 
the strength and direction of relationships among variables. None of the Pearson correlation 
values exceeded 0.9. Multicollinearity can also be evaluated using Variance Inflation Factor 
values (VIF) and tolerance test values. The tolerance test gives a value that measures how 
much of the variability of a specific independent variable is not explained by the other 
independent variables. The formula used for this calculation is 1 – R2 and values less than 0.1 
are a strong indication of high correlation with the other variables and should probably be 
removed. The VIF is simply the inverse of the tolerance value and is therefore recommended 
that it not exceed 10 (Pallant 2011). For dummy variables that represent categorical variables 
with three categories or more, like in this study, multicollinearity values can be ignored 
because if the reference category has a smaller proportion of the cases than another variable, 
the correlation will inherently be high but not change the outcome of the regression.  
Durbin Watson tests were performed to account for auto-collinearity. All regression models 
had test values between 1 and 3 and they were relatively close to 2 indicating a lack of auto 
correlation. These numbers can be found in Table 9 in chapter 5 and Appendix II.  
An additional consideration was made to ensure homoscedasticity by checking histograms, 
normal predicted probability (P-P) plots and scatter plots of regression standardized residuals 
against regression standardized predicted values for heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity 
occurs if there is variation in the variance of the independent variables or dependent variable. 
Conversely, homoscedasticity occurs when the variance of the residuals is constant or equal 
for all dependent variable values. This was observed by the aforementioned relevant plots. 
The only potential concern is the heavy tailed distributions seen in the normal probability 
plots (P-P), especially in 2012.  
The last assumptions that are made are for normality of the residuals for the dependent 
variables by checking their respective scatter plots, but this can also be assumed based on the 
previously mentioned central limit theorem. It is also assumed that the independent variables 
are known and not random. The last assumption made is that none of the independent 
variables are linear functions of any other variables used in the equations.    
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5. RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1. Overall mean days for dependent variables  
Variable Ready for discharge year N Mean Std. Deviation 
Delayed Discharge Days 2011 5698 4.83 4.394 
2012 10573 .31 1.259 
Days From Deadline 2011 4337 -.78 3.516 
2012 10507 .23 1.246 
Payment Days 2011 1206 3.15 3.421 
2012 1136 2.52 2.705 
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 2, 
Figures 8-12 and Appendix I. As expected from the policy change and resulting lack of time 
between notification and deadline (when payments begin), the mean number of days between 
when the ready for discharge notifications were given and actual discharges took place 
(‘delayed discharge days’) in 2012 (.31) is far less than the 2011 mean (4.83) (See page 24, 
Figure 6 for graphical timeline reference). Also as expected, the mean number of days 
between the discharge deadline and actual discharge (‘days from deadline’) from 2011 (-.78) 
is negative and by far less than that of 2012 (.23) but this can be explained by the fact that 
negatives values existed in 2011 and were theoretically impossible in 2012. This was due to a 
large 7 day window in 2011 for a discharge to be made within Oslo, making it possible for the 
value of this variable to be less than zero. Yet, when taking this into account by looking at 
only those discharges who exceeded the discharge deadline (‘payment days’), the mean 
number of days in 2011 (3.15) was greater than that in 2012 (2.52). All of these differences 
proved to be statistically significant at the .05 level when a t-test was performed (See Table 
2). In Table 1, we also see a sharp increase in the number of cases from 2011 to 2012 in the 
first two measures, with delayed discharge days having nearly doubled in number of patient 
discharges and days from deadline having more than doubled. As previously mentioned, all 
sample sizes are relatively large, such that I am able to assume normality even though the 
skewness and kurtosis values for all variables are quite large and positive (See Appendix I). 
Table 2 shows the results from independent-samples t-tests that were conducted to compare 
the difference in the mean number of delayed discharge days, days from deadline and 
payment days between 2011 and 2012. 
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Table 2. T-test results for overall dependent variables  
Variable 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 4402.193 .000 98.507 16269 .000 4.518 
Equal variances not assumed   75.965 6205.817 .000 4.518 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 4585.794 .000 -25.779 14842 .000 -1.010 
Equal variances not assumed   -18.442 4791.997 .000 -1.010 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 24.028 .000 4.922 2340 .000 .630 
Equal variances not assumed   4.956 2272.536 .000 .630 
There was a significant difference in the number of delayed discharge days between 2011 
(M=4.83, SD=4.39) and 2012 (M=.31, SD=1.259); t(6205.82)= 75.97, p<.001. There was also 
a significant difference in the number of days from deadline between 2011 (M=-0.78, 
SD=3.52) and 2012 (M=.23, SD=1.246); t(4792)= -18.44, p<.001. Likewise, the difference in 
payment days was significant between 2011 (M=3.15, SD=3.42) and 2012 (M=2.25, 
SD=2.71); t(2272.54)= 4.96, p<.001. These results suggest that there was a significant change 
in the periods of time that are of interest including when accounting for only those who 
exceeded the deadline.    
To further investigate the impact of the differences between years (before and after reform 
implementation) for delayed discharge days, days from deadline and payment days, a series of 
two-tailed independent t-tests were conducted on the data stratified by measures of city 
district, hospital, where patients were discharged to, age and gender. Initial examination of the 
data indicated that there were no significant violations of the assumptions of the t-test for any 
of the dependent variables. 
5.1.1 Independent variables  
The data shows varied differences among gender, age groups, hospitals, city districts and 
locations to which patients were discharged for the two years. The relative percentages for the 
variables and total counts relating to their respective year can be seen in Figures 8-12. The 
two years are displayed side-by-side so the change in percentage can be seen from year to 
year. The means for delayed discharge days, days from deadline and payment days for each 
variable can also be seen in Tables 3-7. One can speculate that these differences, between 
years among the different variables, are due to the implementation of the reform, finances 
spent on applicable nursing care, proportion of immigrants in the population or other 
unforeseen determinants affecting the use of services by each variable.  
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Gender 
 
Figure 8. Gender distribution by percentage and total count based on year of ready for 
discharge notification 
Women are more heavily represented in the dataset, and distribution of gender between the 
two years was pretty consistent with 62.6% women in 2011 and 60.5% women in 2012 as 
seen in Figure 8.  
Table 3. Mean days by gender for dependent variables  
Gender Ready for discharge year Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
Male 2011 4.81 -.71 3.34 
2012 .31 .23 2.72 
Female 2011 4.85 -.81 3.05 
2012 .32 .24 2.41 
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Age Groups 
 
Figure 9. Age group distribution of discharges by percentages and total count based on 
year of ready for discharge notification 
Based on Figure 9, we see that between the years, based on percentage, there was a shift 
between the age groups below 79 years and those above 80. For those in age groups below 79 
years there were a greater percentage of discharges in 2012 relating to the overall total. The 
opposite was true for those above 80 years, those groups had a higher percentages relating to 
the overall discharges in 2011 than 2012. It can also be seen that in 2011 over 60% (64.08) of 
the patients discharges needing municipal services after discharge were 80 years old or above. 
2012 was similar with over 55% (56.45) 80 years or older.  
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Table 4. Mean days by age group for dependent variables  
Age Group Ready for discharge year Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
0-17 år 2011 2.67 . . 
2012 6.14 6.14 43.00 
18-49 år 2011 4.13 -.05 3.75 
2012 .14 .05 2.82 
50-66 år 2011 4.29 -.86 3.58 
2012 .15 .11 2.61 
67-74 år 2011 4.75 -.71 3.88 
2012 .20 .14 2.27 
75-79 år 2011 4.61 -.75 3.14 
2012 .29 .23 2.53 
80-84 år 2011 4.84 -.89 3.01 
2012 .34 .24 2.23 
85-89 år 2011 4.89 -.85 2.80 
2012 .41 .31 2.60 
90-200 år 2011 5.24 -.68 3.11 
2012 .43 .34 2.59 
a. t cannot be computed because at least one of the groups is empty. 
 
The mean number of days for each age group corresponding to the three measures is found 
above in Table 4. When comparing the groups, 0-17 years was disregarded due to such a low 
number of cases. We see that the mean number of delayed discharge days for 2011 and 2012 
increases with age from 18-49 years to 90-200 years. This is also true for days from deadline 
when looking at 2012, but is more complicated due to negative values in 2011. Based on the 
numbers, in 2011 the greatest mean was -0.05 days (18-49 years) and the lowest -0.89 days 
(80-84 years).  If there was a patient the municipality had to pay for, the greatest mean was 
3.88 days (67-74 years) in 2011 and 2.82 days (18-49 years) in 2012. The lowest means were 
2.8 days (85-89 years) in 2011 and 2.23 days (80-84 years) in 2012.  
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare these means between 2011 and 2012, 
stratified by age groups. The complete t-test results are found in Appendix I. There was a 
significant difference (p<.05) in the extent of delayed discharge in all age groups between 
2011 and 2012. There was also a significant difference (p<.05) in the extent of days from 
deadline for all age groups between 2011 and 2012 except for 0-17 years and 18-49 years. 
Additionally, when accounting for those whose discharges exceeded the deadline (payment 
days) the only age groups with a significant difference (p<.05) between 2011 and 2012 were 
67-74 years, 80-84 years and 90-200 years. All other age groups did not have a significant 
difference regarding this measure. These results suggest that there was a significant change in 
these periods of time which are of interest for all age groups of patient discharges except for 
those groups identified as not having a significant difference.  
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Hospitals
 
Figure 10. Hospital distribution of discharges by percentages and total count based on 
year of ready for discharge notification 
Looking at Figure 10, we see the greatest percentage of discharges requiring municipal 
services in 2011 were from Akershus universitetssykehus, with Ullevål a close second. In 
2012, Ullevål had by far the greatest percentage of discharges requiring municipal services, 
over ten percent higher than Akershus universitetssykehus who had the next highest 
percentage.   Between the two years from 2011 to 2012, Akershus universitetssykehus, OUS 
Aker and Diakonhjemmet had a decrease in their percentage of the overall discharges 
requiring municipal services, whereas Lovisenberg sykehus and Ullevål experienced an 
increase. 
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Table 5. Mean days by hospital for dependent variables   
Hospital Ready for discharge year Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
Akershus universitetssykehus 2011 3.23 2.20 4.32 
2012 .18 .14 2.13 
OUS Aker 2011 5.90 -.43 2.90 
2012 .36 .14 2.34 
Diakonhjemmet 2011 5.38 -.96 3.64 
2012 .80 .78 2.62 
Lovisenberg sykehus 2011 5.12 -.91 2.31 
2012 .08 .06 1.87 
Ullevål 2011 5.43 -1.18 2.75 
2012 .35 .22 2.76 
Andre 2011 4.20 -.34 5.40 
2012 .27 .13 3.08 
The mean number of days for each hospital corresponding to the three measures is found 
above in Table 5. We see that the mean number of delayed discharge days in 2011 was 
greatest for OUS Aker and for Diakonhjemmet in 2012. Akershus universitetssykehus had the 
shortest mean delayed discharge days in 2011, whereas Lovisenberg sykehus had the shortest 
in 2012. Interestingly, even though Akershus universitetssykehus had the shortest mean 
delayed discharge days in 2011, it was the only hospital with a positive mean for days from 
deadline in the same year. The lowest mean for days from deadline in 2011 was from Ullevål 
which was below -1. In 2012, Diakonhjemmet had the greatest mean for days from deadline 
and Lovisenberg sykehus the lowest. When the municipality had to pay for a patient, the 
greatest mean was 4.32 days (Akershus universitetssykehus) in 2011 and 2.76 days (Ullevål) 
in 2012. This is disregarding “Andre” (Other), since it cannot be attributed to a specific 
hospital, which was the greatest for both years. Lovisenberg sykehus had the lowest mean 
payment days for both years with 2.31 days in 2011 and 1.87 days in 2012.  
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare these means between 2011 and 2012, 
stratified by hospital. The complete t-test results are found in Appendix I. There was a 
significant difference (p<.05) in delayed discharge for patients from all hospitals between 
2011 and 2012. There was also a significant difference in days from deadline for all hospitals 
except those bundled at “Andre” (other) for 2011 and 2012. Akershus universitetssykehus, 
Diakonhjemmet and Lovisenberg sykehus all had significant differences (p<.05) in the 
number of days for those patients who exceeded their discharge deadline date (payment days) 
between 2011 and 2012. The remaining hospitals did not display a significant difference 
pertaining to this measure. These results suggest that there was a significant change at the 
individual hospital level for delayed discharge days, days from deadline and payment days 
except for those differences between hospitals that were identified as not having a significant 
difference.  
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City Districts
 
Figure 11. City district distribution of discharges by percen tages and total count based 
on year of ready for discharge notification 
In Figure 11, we see that the city district, with the greatest percentage of discharges requiring 
municipal services in 2011, was Alna. In 2012, Østensjø had the greatest percentage of 
discharges requiring municipal services. Overall, we can see wide variation in the changes 
between the two years among the city districts relating to the percentage of discharges 
requiring municipal services.  
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Table 6. Mean days by city district for dependent variables   
City District Ready for discharge year Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
Gamle Oslo 2011 5.63 -.40 2.40 
2012 .11 .07 2.38 
Grünerløkka 2011 4.75 -1.20 2.25 
2012 .11 .07 2.00 
Sagene 2011 4.74 -1.36 2.96 
2012 .05 .02 2.00 
St. Hanshaugen 2011 6.11 .13 2.68 
2012 .15 .13 1.63 
Frogner 2011 5.31 -.73 3.40 
2012 .80 .79 2.52 
Ullern 2011 5.68 -.33 3.52 
2012 .25 .22 1.43 
Vestre Aker 2011 5.17 -1.93 4.56 
2012 1.41 1.41 3.11 
Nordre Aker 2011 5.00 -1.44 2.03 
2012 .12 .08 2.76 
Bjerke 2011 5.56 -.41 1.75 
2012 .28 -.02 1.24 
Grorud 2011 3.34 2.59 4.24 
2012 .12 .08 3.88 
Stovner 2011 2.53 5.00 13.00 
2012 .29 .27 2.26 
Alna 2011 3.88 -1.11 2.43 
2012 .18 .13 2.06 
Østensjø 2011 6.38 -.61 2.94 
2012 .85 .66 3.08 
Norstrand 2011 5.33 -1.68 3.50 
2012 .20 .01 1.85 
Søndre Norstrand 2011 5.27 -.88 3.42 
2012 .04 -.04 1.29 
 
The mean number of days for each city district for each of the three measures studied is found 
above in Table 6. The mean number of delayed discharge days was greatest for Østensjø in 
2011 and Vestre Aker in 2012. Stovner had the shortest mean delayed discharge days in 2011, 
whereas Søndre Norstrand had the shortest in 2012. Interestingly, in addition to the lowest 
mean for delayed discharge days in 2011, Stovner had the greatest mean for days from 
discharge in that year. Vestre Aker had the lowest mean for days from deadline in 2011 but 
the greatest in 2012. Søndre Norstrand had the lowest mean for days from deadline in 2012. 
In cases when the municipality had to pay for an exceeded deadline, the greatest mean was 
13.0 days (Stovner) in 2011 and 3.88 days (Grorud) in 2012. Bjerke had the lowest mean 
payment days for both years with 1.75 days in 2011 and 1.24 days in 2012.  
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare these means between 2011 and 2012, 
stratified by city district. The complete t-test results are found in Appendix I. There was a 
significant difference (p<.05) in delayed discharge days in all districts between 2011 and 
2012. There was also a significant difference (p<.05) in days from deadline for all districts 
except St. Hanshaugen and Stovner for 2011 and 2012. St. Hanshaugen, Ullern, Norstrand 
and Søndre Norstrand all had significant differences (p<.05) in the number of days when 
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accounting for those discharges which exceeded their deadlines (payment days) between 2011 
and 2012. All other districts did not display a significant difference pertaining to this measure. 
These results suggest that there was a significant change at the individual city district level for 
delayed discharge days, days from deadline and payment days except for those districts 
identified as not having significant differences.  
Discharged to location
 
Figure 12. Distribution of locations patients were sent upon discharge by percentages 
and total count based on year of ready for discharge notification  
Figure 12 shows the location that patients were sent to upon discharge, the most common 
based on percentage, was korttidopphold (short-term stay) in 2011 and hjemme (home) in 
2012. Based on over all percentages, there was a 15% increase in patients being sent home for 
care between 2011 and 2012.  
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Table 7. Mean days by location sent upon discharge for dependent variables   
Discharged to Ready for discharge year Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
Hjemme 2011 3.26 -1.75 2.93 
2012 .11 .05 2.67 
Korttidopphold 2011 5.81 -.36 3.05 
2012 .59 .47 2.59 
Korttid samhandling 2011 4.80 -1.20 3.00 
2012 .25 .21 2.08 
Korttid intermediær 2011 4.48 -.58 3.81 
2012 .26 .13 2.07 
Korttid rehabilitering 2011 5.76 -.39 3.30 
2012 .49 .41 2.36 
Korttid Vurderingsplass 2011 6.07 -.42 3.08 
2012 .64 .58 2.00 
Langtidsopphold 2011 8.08 1.13 5.14 
2012 .59 .44 2.68 
Annet 2011 4.61 -.75 3.46 
2012 .49 .46 2.48 
Table 7 shows the mean number of days for the three periods based on the location to which 
patients were sent upon discharge. The mean number of delayed discharge days and days 
from deadline was greatest for those sent to langtidsopphold (long-term stay) in 2011 and to 
korttid vurderingsplass (short-term evaluation place) in 2012. Patients discharged home to 
receive care had the shortest mean delayed discharge days and days from deadline in 2011 
and 2012. If the discharge deadline was exceeded and a patient had to be paid for by the 
municipality, the greatest mean was for patients sent to langtidsopphold with 5.14 days in 
2011 and 2.68 days in 2012. Those discharged to home care (hjemme) had the lowest mean 
payment days in 2011 and korttid vurderingsplass in 2012.  
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare these means between 2011 and 2012, 
stratified by location to which patients were sent upon discharge. The complete t-test results 
are found in Appendix I. There was a significant difference (p<.05) in delayed discharge days 
for all locations patients were sent upon being discharged between 2011 and 2012. There was 
also a significant difference in days from deadline for all locations patients were sent upon 
being discharged in 2011 and 2012 except for korttid samhandling, korttid intermediær and 
langtidsopphold. Additionally, regarding payment days, those sent to korttidopphold, korttid 
rehabilitering, korttid vurderingsplass and langtidsopphold locations showed a significant 
difference (p<.05) between 2011 and 2012. The other location types did not have a significant 
difference between the two years. These results suggest that there was a significant change in 
delayed discharge days, days from deadline and payment days for all locations patients were 
sent upon being discharged except for those location types that have been identified as not 
having a significant difference.  
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5.1.2 Supply and demand variables 
Table 8. Supply and demand characteristics of city districts in 2011 and 2012  
City District Year Population 
Spending on Nursing Care in 1000 
NOK 
% Population over 80 
years 
% Immigrant 
population 
Gamle Oslo 
2011 43770 
330,931 
1.76 24.9 
2012 44958 1.67 24.9 
Grünerløkka 
2011 47256 
431,426 
2.26 17.8 
2012 49307 2.03 17.7 
Sagene 
2011 35115 
405,079 
2.57 14.4 
2012 35990 2.38 14.4 
St. Hanshaugen 
2011 33137 
285,988 
2.62 10.3 
2012 34109 2.45 10 
Frogner 
2011 51120 
611,656 
4.07 7.2 
2012 52531 3.96 7.7 
Ullern 
2011 30744 
416,195 
5.41 5.9 
2012 31275 5.15 5.8 
Vestre Aker 
2011 44320 
611,422 
4.74 5.6 
2012 45186 4.67 5.8 
Nordre Aker 
2011 47433 
590,673 
4.33 7.4 
2012 48432 4.19 7.7 
Bjerke 
2011 28226 
414,348 
4.58 29.2 
2012 29090 4.30 29.4 
Grorud 
2011 26291 
410,067 
4.19 34.1 
2012 26777 4.09 34.8 
Stovner 
2011 30178 
379,628 
2.90 40 
2012 30554 2.98 41.1 
Alna 
2011 47025 
728,473 
3.74 36.6 
2012 47786 3.70 37.4 
Østensjø 
2011 46244 
739,650 
6.36 13.8 
2012 47164 6.22 14.1 
Norstrand 
2011 46888 
684,861 
5.91 6.6 
2012 47696 5.79 6.8 
Søndre 
Norstrand 
2011 35843 
327,456 
1.63 38.4 
2012 36304 1.63 39 
Table 8 provides the percentages used for population over 80 years and immigrants in the city 
districts of Oslo. The values used in calculating per person spending on nursing care 
(population and spending) are also displayed. Again, since the spending numbers for 2012 are 
not yet available, yet unlikely to significantly change from 2011, the 2011 figures were used 
with the 2012 population numbers to calculate the per person spending. 
5.2 Multivariate Least Squares Regressions  
The main objective to performing the multiple linear regressions was to investigate variation 
in the specific time periods between when the ready for discharge notification was given and 
the actual discharge took place. In every model, over 5,000 patient discharges were included 
in the time period between 2011 and 2012, covering all patients requiring municipal services 
after they were discharged within the municipality of Oslo, except for those concerning 
payment days which had over 1,000 (see Appendix I). This study’s primary emphasis is 
geographic and demographic variations related to the time between when a patient is deemed 
ready for discharge and their actual discharge, with a secondary focus on days from the 
discharge deadline and actual discharge, as well as, if payment had to be made by the 
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municipality. The analyses are based on the possible variation between age, gender, hospitals, 
city districts, and what type of facility to which patients are sent upon being discharged. 
All analyses were performed according to the multiple regression model described in a 
previous chapter (See section 4.3). Multiple models are included in the results, all different 
variations to explain the time periods delayed discharge days, days from deadline and 
payment days. The regressions were performed accounting for 2011 and 2012 individually 
and then a single model equation accounting for difference in year within the equation. 
To evaluate the hypotheses previously made, estimates of the intercept and the independent 
variables are described below. 
When accounting for year the discharge notification took place, Ullevål sykehus had the 
largest percentage of discharges and was closest to the overall mean for both days of delayed 
discharge and days from deadline for 2012. The city district of Østensjø had the highest 
overall percentage of discharges for 2011 and 2012 combined. Home (Hjemme) was far and 
away the greatest location which patients were discharged to in 2012, by percentage, with 
53.2% and close second in 2011. Based on these findings, the regression analyses were 
conducted using those three reference category variables (Ullevål sykehus, Østensjø and 
Hjemme) by excluding their dummy variables from the equations. Males and age group 18-49 
years were also used as reference categories for all models. In even numbered models, year 
was included in the model equation with 2011 as the reference variable. The basic model 
equations were estimated using multiple linear regression analysis, and the results are reported 
in Table 9 and Appendix II. Comments about the regression estimates are given and then 
further explained in the discussion chapter.  
5.2.1 Delayed discharge days 
Multiple linear regressions were carried out to ascertain the extent to which age, gender, city 
district, hospital, and type of services discharged to predict the number of delayed discharge 
days (days between a discharge ready notification and actual discharge). Model I looks at 
2011 and 2012 independently and Model II has the years combined. In models III-VI 
additional supply, demand, and population variables were added and analyzed both for 2011 
and 2012 independently, and then combined as in Models I and II.  
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Table 9. Regression models for Delayed discharge days  
 Estimate β 
Variable 
Model I 
Model II 
Model III 
Model IV 
Model V 
Model VI 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
(Constant) 4.879**** .740**** 5.091**** 4.105**** -.353*** 4.044**** 5.955**** -.007 5.104**** 
Female -.127 -.036 -.044 -.101 -.029 -.036 -.104 -.026 -.041 
Discharge Ready 2012   -4.346**** - - -4.320**** - - -4.344**** 
0-17 år .127 6.116**** 4.195**** -.166 5.980**** 4.091**** -.396 5.957**** 4.025**** 
50-66 år -.249 -.059 -.148 -.308 -.080 -.178 -.281 -.100 -.171 
67-74 år -.120 -.089 -.105 -.193 -.091 -.138 -.184 -.103 -.139 
75-79 år -.450 -.084 -.229 -.490 -.090 -.260* -.445 -.086 -.241* 
80-84 år -.505 -.101 -.266** -.554 -.091 -.286** -.513 -.090 -.261* 
85-89 år -.539 -.022 -.243* -.581 -.046 -.284** -.519 -.042 -.257* 
90-200 år -.446 -.032 -.197 -.508 -.043 -.228* -.429 -.032 -.188 
Gamle Oslo .140 -.607**** -.441**** - - - - - - 
Grünerløkka -1.167**** -.654**** -.831**** - - - - - - 
Sagene -1.138**** -.731**** -.905**** - - - - - - 
St. Hanshaugen .391 -.594**** -.328** - - - - - - 
Frogner -.647* -.154* -.404** - - - - - - 
Ullern -.169 -.714**** -.508*** - - - - - - 
Vestre Aker -.930** .478**** -.125 - - - - - - 
Nordre Aker -1.457**** -.764**** -.968**** - - - - - - 
Bjerke -.833*** -.605**** -.692**** - - - - - - 
Grorud -1.662**** -.511**** -.986**** - - - - - - 
Stovner -2.090**** -.264** -1.131**** - - - - - - 
Alna -1.126** -.447**** -.752**** - - - - - - 
Norstrand -1.103**** -.718**** -.813**** - - - - - - 
Søndre Norstrand -.778* -.765**** -.791**** - - - - - - 
Akershus  
universitetssykehus 
-.4861 -.2411** -.3511** -.978**** -.135*** -.571**** - - - 
OUS Aker .461** .017 .346**** .544*** .032 .362**** - - - 
Diakonhjemmet .249 .054 .139 .540*** .492**** .450**** - - - 
Lovisenberg sykehus -.033 -.092* -.059 .524** .070* .242*** - - - 
Andre .019 -.067 -.134 -.495 .007 -.154 - - - 
Korttidopphold 2.321**** .452**** 1.111**** 2.278**** .411**** 1.077**** 2.343**** .422**** 1.092**** 
Korttid samhandling .111 .257** .173 1.102 .288*** .400* .826 .246** .311 
Korttid intermediær 1.476**** .068 .492**** 1.327**** .086 .465*** 1.239**** .081 .430*** 
Korttid rehabilitering 2.064**** .329**** .985**** 2.086**** .328**** 1.011**** 2.160**** .354**** 1.020**** 
Korttid 
Vurderingsplass 
2.130**** .337**** 1.195**** 2.294**** .358**** 1.235**** 2.462**** .452**** 1.314**** 
Langtidsopphold 4.537**** .484**** 2.056**** 4.483**** .459**** 2.034**** 4.572**** .475**** 2.036**** 
Annet 1.182**** .334*** .574**** 1.220*** .327*** .575**** 1.331**** .345*** .591**** 
Percentage from 
Africa, Asia, Turkey 
and South and Central 
America 
- - - .023** .010**** .016**** - - - 
percent_pop_over_80 - - - .5021**** .1831**** .3411**** .656**** .158**** .402**** 
combined spending on 
nursing care by 1000 
NOK 
- - - -.201*** -.0301** -.1021**** -.362**** -.030**** -.179**** 
Adjusted R Square .118 .114 .418 .107 .078 .414 .102 .065 .411 
Durbin Watson 1.822 1.731 1.723 1.821 1.643 1.723 1.793 1.624 1.700 
**** = p≤0.001,  *** = p≤0.01,  ** = p≤0.05,  * = p≤0.10  
1 = VIF > 10 
 
Models I and II 
Model I predicted 11.8% of the variation of delayed discharge days for 2011 and 11.4% of the 
variation for 2012. The model was suitable for predicting the outcome (F = 23.32 (2011) and 
41.187 (2012), df = 34, p <.001).  
In considering the constants, we notice the number of days between ready to be discharged 
notification and actual discharge was 4.879 days in 2011 and 0.740 days in 2012 depending 
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on the reference categories male, between the ages of 18 and 49 years, in Ullevål sykehus, 
from the district of Østensjø, and discharged home. 
In this model no age group was a significant predictor in 2011 and only one in 2012 (0-17 
years) with 6.116 (p<0.001). This indicates that the length of time between notification and 
actual discharge was longer by 6.116 days if a patient’s age was below 18 years in 2012 but 
had no effect in 2011 when all other variables were constant.  
The variable “Female” accounting for gender with male as the reference category has an 
estimate of -0.127 for 2011 and -0.036 for 2012 but both are not significant. This indicates 
that the length of time between notification and actual discharge was not affected by gender in 
2011 or 2012 when all other variables were constant.  
For 2011, the districts Grünerløkka (p<.01), Sagene (p<.01), Frogner (p<.10), Vestre Aker 
(p<.05), Nordre Aker (p<.001), Bjerke (p<.01), Grorud (p<.01), Stovner (p<.001), Alna 
(p<.05), Norstrand (p<.001) and Søndre Norstrand (p<.10) all had significantly negative 
correlations to the number of delayed discharge days. This indicates that they each had shorter 
amounts of delayed discharge than the reference district Østensjø if everything else is 
constant. All the other correlations for the remaining districts from 2011 were not significant. 
The district Vestre Aker (p<.001) had a significantly positive correlation in the number of 
days between notification and actual discharge in 2012 in comparison to the reference district 
Østensjø, whereas all of the other districts had significantly negative correlations. This is an 
indication that Vestre Aker, with a positive correlation, had delayed discharge periods longer 
than Østensjø and those negatively represented districts had shorter durations compared to the 
reference with everything else being constant.  
The only hospital with significant correlation to the reference, Ullevål, for delayed discharge 
days in 2011 was OUS Aker (p<.05) with a positive correlation of 0.461 days. 2012 only had 
two significantly correlated hospital to the reference which were Akershus 
universitetssykehus (p<.01) and Lovisenberg (p<.10) with negative correlations of -0.241 and 
-0.092 days respectively. These relationships indicate that OUS Aker had a longer mean 
length of time in 2011 whereas Akershus universitetssykehus and Lovisenberg shorter in 2012 
than Ullevål concerning the duration of delayed discharge days with everything else being 
constant.  
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When considering the locations to where patients were discharged in 2011, all locations 
except for Korttid samhandling (p=.953), had significantly positive correlations 
(Korttidopphold (p<.001), Korttid intermediær (p<.001), Korttid rehabilitering (p<.001), 
Korttid Vurderingsplass (p<.001), Langtidsopphold (p<.001), Annet (p<.01) compared to the 
reference Hjemme (Home) with everything else being constant. 2012 was similar with all 
locations, except Korttid intermediær (p=.396), having significantly positive correlations 
(Korttidopphold (p<.001), Korttid samhandling (p<.05), Korttid rehabilitering (p<.001), 
Korttid Vurderingsplass (p<.001), Langtidsopphold (p<.001), Annet (p<.01)) for delayed 
discharge days compared to the reference location Hjemme (Home) with everything else 
being constant. This means that time between notification and actual discharge for those 
patients going home or needing home care was significantly shorter than all other locations in 
both 2011 and 2012 with the exception of those two that were mentioned as being non-
significant. 
Model II analyzed the same information as model I but combined the data and included the 
year in the equation.  This model predicted 41.8% of the variation in delayed discharge days 
and was suitable for predicting the outcome (F = 335.214, df = 35, p < .001).  
According to the model constant, the extent of delayed discharge days was 5.091 days 
depending on the reference categories; notification year 2011, male, age between 18 and 49 
years, in Ullevål sykehus, from the district of Østensjø, and discharged home.  
The variable “Discharge Ready in 2012,” accounting for the difference in year the discharge 
notification was given, was included and there is a significantly negative correlation between 
the year 2012 (p<.001) and the reference 2011 of -4.35 days. This means when everything 
else remains constant, there are 4.35 less days between discharge notification and actual 
discharge in 2012 than 2011 for those patients requiring municipal services.    
In this model, only the age groups 0-17 years (p<.001), 80-84 years (p<.05) and 85-89 years 
(p<.10) had significant correlations with 4.195, -0.266 and -0.243 respectively. This indicates 
that the length of time between notification and actual discharge was longer by 4.195 days for 
those less than 17 years and shorter by 0.266 and 0.243 days for those between the ages of 80 
and 84 and 85 and 89 compared to those between the ages of 18 and 49 when all other 
variables were constant. The age group 75-79 years was nearly significantly correlated with a 
significance value of p=.101. 
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The variable “Female,” accounting for gender with male as the reference category, was not 
significant. This indicates that the length of time between notification and actual discharge 
was not affected by gender when all other variables were constant.  
All districts had significantly negative correlations to the days between notification and actual 
discharge except for Vestre Aker, which was not significant. This indicates that they all had 
shorter extents of delayed discharge than the reference district Østensjø concerning days from 
notification of discharge ready to actual discharge when everything else is constant.  
The only hospitals with significant correlations to the reference Ullevål for days between 
notification and actual discharge in were OUS Aker (p<.001) which was positive with 0.346 
days and Akershus universitetssykehus (p<.05) with a negative correlation of -0.351 days. 
These relationships mean that OUS Aker had a longer period of time and Akershus 
universitetssykehus shorter than Ullevål’s delayed discharge days with everything else being 
constant.  
When considering the locations to where patients were discharged, all locations except for 
Korttid samhandling had significantly positive correlations (Korttidopphold (p<.001), Korttid 
intermediær (p=.001), Korttid rehabilitering (p<.001), Korttid Vurderingsplass (p<.001), 
Langtidsopphold (p<.001), Annet (p=.001)) compared with the reference Hjemme (home) 
with everything else being constant. This means that the extent of delayed discharge days for 
those patients going home or needing home care was significantly shorter than all other 
locations with all else being constant with the exception of Korttid samhandling. 
Models III and IV 
Models III and IV functioned much like model I and II in the sense that model III gives 
equations for 2011 and 2012 individually, and model IV accounts for year of discharge 
notification in the equation as an independent variable. Model III and IV go beyond the 
differences in payment scheme and definition and introduce the variables to characterize 
supply and demand at the district level. These supply and demand variables, represented by 
percentage of inhabitants over age 80 and spending on home and non-hospital institutional 
nursing care, are stratified by city district, and therefore act as proxies for districts, which 
have been omitted to avoid collinearity.    
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Model III predicted 10.7% of the variation of delayed discharge days for 2011 and 7.8% of 
the variation for 2012. The model was suitable for predicting the outcome (F = 30.694 (2011) 
and 39.729 (2012), df = 23, p <.001).  
Based on the constants, the number of delayed discharge days was 4.105 in 2011 and -.353 
days in 2012 depending on the reference categories male, between the ages of 18 and 49 
years, in Ullevål sykehus, from the district of Østensjø, and discharged home. 
In this model no age group was a significant predictor in 2011 and only one in 2012 (0-17 
years) with 5.980 (p<0.001). This indicates that the length of time between notification and 
actual discharge was longer by 5.980 days if a patient’s age was below 18 years in 2012 but 
had no effect in 2011 when all other variables were constant. 
The variable “Female,” accounting for gender with male as the reference category, has an 
estimate of -0.101 for 2011 and -0.029 for 2012 but both are not significant. This indicates 
that the length of time between notification and actual discharge was not affected by gender in 
2011 or 2012 when all other variables were constant.  
All hospitals had significant correlations in 2011 except for those grouped as Andre. Akershus 
universitetssykehus had a negative correlation of -0.978 (p<.001) whereas the other three 
were positively correlated with OUS Aker 0.544 (p<.01), Diakonhjemmet 0.540 (p<.01) and 
Lovisenberg sykehus 0.524 (p<.05).  2012 was similar with the exception of OUS Aker also 
not being significant with those grouped as Andre. Again, Akershus universitetssykehus had a 
negative correlation of -0.135 (p<.01) and Diakonhjemmet and Lovisenberg sykehus were 
positive with 0.492 (p<.001) and 0.070 (p<.10) days respectively. These relationships indicate 
Akershus universitetssykehus had shorter extents of delayed discharge than Ullevål in both 
2011 and 2012, whereas the others that were significant had longer periods of delayed 
discharge with everything else being constant.  
When considering the locations to which patients were discharged in 2011, all locations 
except for Korttid samhandling had significantly positive correlations (Korttidopphold 
(p<.001), Korttid intermediær (p<.001), Korttid rehabilitering (p<.001), Korttid 
Vurderingsplass (p<.001), Langtidsopphold (p<.001), Annet (p<.01) compared to the 
reference Hjemme (Home) with everything else being constant. 2012 was similar with all 
locations, except Korttid intermediær, having significantly positive correlations 
(Korttidopphold (p<.001), Korttid samhandling (p<.01), Korttid rehabilitering (p<.001), 
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Korttid Vurderingsplass (p<.001), Langtidsopphold (p<.001), Annet (p<.01)) for delayed 
discharge days compared to the reference location Hjemme (Home) with everything else 
constant. This means that time between notification and actual discharge for those patients 
going home or needing home care was significantly shorter than all other locations in both 
2011 and 2012 with the exception of those two that were mentioned as being non-significant. 
The supply and demand variables, including percentage of immigrants, were all significant for 
both years. Percentage of immigrants was positively significant with 0.023 (p<.05) in 2011 
and 0.010 (p<.001) in 2012. The variable accounting for percentage of the population above 
80 years old was significantly positive in both years, 0.502 (p<.001) in 2011 and 0.183 
(p<.001) in 2012. The supply side variable for spending on nursing was significantly negative 
for both years with -0.201(p<.01) in 2011 and -0.030 (p<.05) in 2012. The variables for 
population over 80 and spending on nursing both had high collinearity with VIF values above 
10. This was adjusted for in models V and VI.   
Model IV analyzed the same information as model III but combined the data and included the 
year of discharge notification in the equation. This model predicted 41.4% of the variation in 
delayed discharge days and was suitable for predicting the outcome (F = 480.546, df = 24, 
p<.001).  
According to the model constant, the extent of delayed discharge days was 4.044 days 
depending on the reference categories notification year 2011, male, age between 18 and 49 
years, in Ullevål sykehus, from the district of Østensjø, and discharged home.  
The variable “Discharge Ready in 2012,” accounting for the difference in year the discharge 
notification was given, was included and there was a significantly negative correlation 
between the year 2012 (p<.001) and the reference 2011 of -4.32 days. This means when 
everything else remains constant, there are 4.32 less days between discharge notification and 
actual discharge in 2012 than 2011 for those patients requiring municipal services.    
In this model the age groups 0-17 years (p<.001), 75-79 (p<.10), 80-84 years (p<.05) and 85-
89 years (p<.05) and 90-200 years (p<.10) had significant correlations with -4.320, -0.260,     
-0.286, -0.284 and -0.228 respectively. This indicates that the length of time between 
notification and actual discharge was longer by 4.32 days for those less than 17 years and 
shorter by 0.260, 0.286, 0.284 and 0.288 days for those between the ages of 70 to 79, 80 to 84, 
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85 to 89 and 90 to 200 compared to those between the ages of 18 and 49 when all other 
variables were constant.  
Just as in model III, the variable “Female” accounting for gender with male as the reference 
category was not significant. Therefore, delayed discharges were not affected by gender when 
all other variables were constant.  
All hospitals had significant correlations in 2011 except for those grouped as Andre. Akershus 
universitetssykehus had a negative correlation of -0.571 (p<.001), whereas the other three 
were positively correlated with OUS Aker 0.362 (p<.001), Diakonhjemmet 0.450 (p<.001) 
and Lovisenberg sykehus 0.242 (p<.01). These relationships indicate Akershus 
universitetssykehus had shorter periods of delayed discharge than Ullevål, whereas the other 
three that were significant had longer periods of delayed discharge with everything else being 
constant.  
When considering the locations to where patients were discharged, all locations, except for 
Korttid samhandling, had significantly positive correlations (Korttidopphold (p<.001), Korttid 
intermediær (p<.01), Korttid rehabilitering (p<.001), Korttid Vurderingsplass (p<.001), 
Langtidsopphold (p<.001), Annet (p<.001)) compared with the reference Hjemme (home) 
with everything else being constant. This means that the extent of delayed discharge days for 
those patients going home or needing home care was significantly shorter than all other 
locations with all else being constant, with the exception of Korttid samhandling. 
The supply and demand variables, including percentage of immigrants were all significant in 
this model. Percentage of immigrants was positively significant 0.016 (p<.0010). The variable 
accounting for percentage of the population above 80 years old was significantly positive with 
0.341 (p<.001). The supply side variable for spending on nursing was significantly negative 
with -0.102 (p<.001). The variables for population over 80 and spending on nursing both had 
high collinearity with VIF values above 10. This was adjusted for in models V and VI. 
Models V and VI 
Models V and VI functioned just the same as models III and IV but variables were removed to 
adjust for collinearity. Hospitals and immigrant population variables were removed in order to 
make the adjustment and retain the supply and demand variables. There were minor changes 
in the variable’s correlation significance. The only changes in significance that occurred for 
2011 were; Annet discharge location went from p<.01to p<.001 and nursing spending went 
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from p<.01 to p<.001. For 2012, korttid samhandling went from p<.01 to p<.05 and nursing 
spending went from p<.05 to p<.001.  For the overall combined model, age groups 80-84 and 
85-89 changed from p<.05 to p<.10, age group 90-200 went from p<.10 to being non-
significant, and korttid samhandling went from p<.10 to being non-significant. There were 
also minor changes in the β coefficients. The complete results are found in Table 9. 
5.2.2 Days From Deadline and Payment Days 
Multiple linear regressions were also performed to ascertain the extent to which the same 
independent variables used for delayed discharge days predict the number of days from 
deadline (days between a discharge deadline and actual discharge). The same was done for 
payments days to determine how those same independent variables affected the number of 
days the municipalities had to pay for, in the event payment was required. In each model, the 
same independent variables used in Models I-VI were included, the results can be found in 
Appendix II. There is less focus on these results due to the complexity in comparability and 
analysis due to the changes in payment requirements and definitions of time periods between 
the two years. Therefore, the results will be briefly described in the discussion chapter 
secondary to the delayed discharge days’ results.   
 
  
62 
 
  
63 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Study objective 
This study aimed to examine the effects on municipal and hospital behavior and decision 
making one year after implementation of the policies suggested in the Coordination Reform 
white paper. Changes in delayed discharges for patients who required municipal services upon 
being discharged were of primary focus. Data from before and after reform implementation 
was used, with special emphasis given to the municipality of Oslo. I first evaluated if there 
was significant difference between 2011 and 2012 (one year before reform implementation 
and one year after) in the periods of time from discharge ready notification to actual 
discharge. Based on those, or lack of, significant differences, I looked at what could explain 
or predict the variation in those periods. Characteristics describing the patients, the hospitals 
and the city districts were used to find probable explanations for the observations made by 
looking at various differences among the city districts of Oslo. 
These different explanations, for the observed variations between different periods of time 
related to a patient’s discharge date, were statistically tested using multiple independent 
predictor variables. 
The increase in the relative costs, for the municipality to provide hospital care for patients 
ready for discharge, was anticipated to result in a decrease in the extent of delayed discharge. 
I also expected a greater extent of delays for those districts with higher percentages of 
population over 80 years of age and a lesser extent for those with more per person spending 
on nursing care.  
6.2 Main findings   
Based on the results of the t-tests, there was a significant difference of 4.518 in the mean 
number of delayed discharge days between 2011 and 2012, meaning that, on average, the 
overall delayed discharges were reduced by 4.518 days. The secondary measures for means, 
days from deadline and payment days, also had significant differences of -1.01 and 0.63 days 
respectively. The days from deadline had an increase of 1.01 days (going from negative to 
positive) between the two years, but are difficult to interpret due to the change in payment 
scheme and what defined the discharge deadline. On the other hand, when accounting for only 
those discharges that elicited payments, if a delayed patient had to be paid for, those payment 
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days were 0.63 days less on average in 2012 than in 2011. To explain these differences, most 
specifically the difference for delayed discharge days, we look to the results from the 
regression models. It is also very interesting to note, that for reasons unknown without 
speculating, the number of patients that were reported as requiring municipal services nearly 
doubled between 2011 and 2012.  
The combined regression models that included the year in the model equation had the greatest 
explanatory power, explaining over 40% of the variance in the mean delayed discharge days. 
These combined regression model results were consistent with the t-test results with the 
difference in delayed discharge days having over a 4 day decrease in 2012. In general, age 
and gender of patients who were discharged did not have a significant effect on the extent of 
delayed discharge. In those few instances where an age group (those above 75 years) was 
mildly significant, they were negatively correlated around -0.2 days. This potentially suggests 
that either the hospitals were better at assessing the needs and predicting a date of discharge 
for those patients who were older than 75 years or the municipality was better able to accept 
those same patients, compared to those who were younger. This could be plausible since over 
half of those discharged to municipal services were 80 years old or above in both years, yet 
there is a certain degree of likelihood that this observation is affected by unrealized 
confounders.  
With the exceptions of korttid samhandling and korttid intermediær, the locations to which 
patients were sent to upon being discharged were consistently, significantly correlated with 
positive effects in relation to the reference group hjemme. Langtidsopphold consistently had 
the greatest positive effect, but those patients make up such a small proportion of those being 
discharged. It is noteworthy, that those sent to general short term care facilities, which 
accounted for between 30 and 40% of the location types patients were discharged to in 2011 
and 2012 (See Figure 12), often had the second highest effects. These results are an indication 
that those patients sent home experience the shortest delays in their discharges and those sent 
to long term care facilities experience the most extensive delays. Based on these findings, 
when deciding what type of services a patient should or will receive upon being discharged, 
and the existing efforts, aimed at allowing people to remain in their homes for as long as 
possible to receive care, should be continued. Based on the change in percentages of those 
discharged home compared to overall discharges, there is an indication that home care is 
increasing. As for general short- and long-term care, the results suggest that for those patients 
who cannot be sent home for continuation of care, expanding efforts that focus on increasing 
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the coordination in transfers to and availability of these locations would have a significant 
impact on reducing delays in discharges.  
Once the city districts were replaced by the proxies that represented the population percentage 
over 80 years and spending on non-hospital institutional and home care nursing, the hospitals 
had significant effects in comparison to Ullevål, the reference hospital, with the exception of 
those grouped as Andre. These effects take into account controlling for age and gender. These 
results could be due to any number of factors including, but not limited to, treating different 
types of patients with different conditions/diagnoses, the culture of the hospital relating to 
eagerness to discharge patients and the type of hospital (local vs. university/research) (See 6.3 
Limitations).         
After the city districts were removed from the models and the supply and demand proxies 
added, the results were as follows: as the percentage of a district’s population over the age of 
80 increased, so did the delays in discharges, likewise, as a district’s per person spending on 
nursing care increased, there was a decrease in the mean number of delayed discharge days. 
These differences were less pronounced in 2012 but so were the number of days allowed 
between discharge ready and discharge deadline. These results are in line with the hypothesis 
and indicate that perhaps the allocation of district funding for nursing should be improved or 
the elderly population proportion taken more into account, as there is currently no real 
correlation as seen in Table 8. The results suggest that if these measures are taken, waiting 
times for patients ready for discharge could be reduced further.     
The findings from the regressions of secondary measures, days from deadline and payment 
days, were similar to those for delayed discharge days, with a few exceptions and the full 
results can be found in Appendix II. The biggest difference in the regression models for days 
from discharge was an interesting change in model XI data for 2011 once the hospitals were 
removed and the supply and demand characteristics were proxies for the city districts (See 
Appendix II). As the percentage of population over 80 increased, the days from deadline 
actually decreased and the opposite was true of spending on nursing care.  It is important to 
note that the explanatory power of this model was only 5%, and more research is required to 
accurately interpret these results.  Additionally, the age groups had a more significant effect 
for 2011 and in the combined models for days to deadline. The independent variables in the 
payment days regression models had sparsely significant effects and the explanatory power 
was reduced from the delayed discharge days models. One similarity to the days from 
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deadline results was the significantly positive effect of nursing spending seen in model XVII 
(See Appendix II). Again, I believe more research with additional data is needed to make 
accurate interpretations and conclusions about these results.    
6.3 Limitations  
Like any research or study, there are limitations to this study and the results should be 
understood with a degree of caution. Due to the reform being the only one of its kind with its 
exact characteristics, there is not much data and research to directly compare. The infancy of 
the policy implementation only allows me to look at the first year after, which can have 
certain characteristics simply due to the fact that it is a transitional period. This first year after 
is also only compared to the preceding year which limits the analytical scope.  
When using register data, there are always concerns about the input reliability and accuracy, 
as well as overall quality of the data sets due to manual user inputs. At the same time, 
selection and recall bias are eliminated. There is also potential for confounding and other bias 
due to the explanatory nature of the study.  
Even with the extensive measures taken to remedy errors and duplicate entries, there is still 
great potential for others to still exist. Standardization of the discharge information in Gerica 
has been mandated as a result of the Coordination Reform. This should alleviate some of the 
comparability problems related to different input and documentation methods that result from 
varied users responsible for the Gerica documentation process. The standardization is 
experiencing an on-going improvement process (Pedersen 2012).    
The quazi-experimental nature of this study, partially uncontrolled before and after, makes it a 
bit less robust than optimal because of the potential uncertainty in accurately identifying the 
cause of the observed outcomes and results (Grimshaw et al. 2000, Eccles et al. 2003). 
Additionally, a post-one year evaluation for an intervention does not give the best data for 
making reliable, nor long-term, conclusions and the research should therefore be extended 
into the future for better long term trending analysis (Habicht, Victora, and Vaughan 1999).  
Admission date data does not exist in the Gerica database and this is required to look at 
patients’ entire lengths of stay, which would have been ideal for this analysis, giving it a 
much more complete picture. Gerica also does not have sufficient, useable documentation of 
the patient diagnosis and comorbidities which would allow me to make interpretations about 
differences seen among the hospitals.  
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6.4 Further Studies/Research  
Based on the limitations and the novelty of this study, due to this reform’s implementation 
infancy and being the only one with its exact characteristics, there will be opportunities for 
further studies and research as more and better quality data becomes available.    
Additional research, that looks at additional years before implementation took place, could 
help give these results more validity by seeing if a trend in decreasing discharge delays 
already existed. The large increase in the number of patients being reported as requiring 
municipal services after the reform was implemented should also be explored further to find a 
likely cause or explanation.     
Though admission date and diagnosis data does not exist in the Gerica database, it does in the 
Norwegian Patient Register (NPR), but unfortunately not at the individual city district level. 
Using admission date with the data in this study would provide the entire length of stay and 
give a comprehensive and more complete look at the results, enabling more descriptive 
results. The inclusion of diagnoses and comorbidities associated with discharged patients 
would enable better interpretations of variations observed among the hospitals. This could be 
done in the future as an extension of this study.  
The fee paid for delayed discharge days (4000 NOK per day) could also be studied as an 
economic endpoint for measuring actual municipal expenses to the hospitals. A concern, 
beyond the scope of this paper, is that increases in premature hospital discharges have the 
potential to result in more re-admissions. These re-admission rates can also function as an 
indicator of municipal hospital expenses and behavior. Further research can help to 
understand this possibility and look at the rates of re-admissions to the hospitals. 
Additionally, depending on the results, in order to keep re-admissions from increasing and 
patients from being discharged too early, other financial deterrents that would penalize 
hospitals if patients are re-admitted within 30 days of discharge could be considered. 
Looking at what happens to patients after being discharged to a municipal facility and the 
change in mortality percentages one week and one month post-discharge could also be 
considered in conjunction with a re-admission analysis relating to the data presented in this 
study. Transfers to different types of municipal facilities within one month of discharge could 
also be evaluated.   
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A study that included a qualitative portion characterizing the patient experiences could be 
useful. If greater proportions of patients, especially those who are elderly, are being sent to 
municipal care directly from the hospital, there may be an increase in these patients and their 
families being forced to make important life altering decisions from a hospital bed. This 
possibility could be studied and incorporated into a further assessment of the changes induced 
by the reform. 
Lastly, the optimal extension of this research would be to link municipal and hospital registers 
to develop a complete and comprehensive database that could be used for comparisons and 
analysis. If this could be accomplished, this broad data matrix of linked data sets could be 
compared to other health systems, especially those which are most similar, for example the 
other Nordic nations. The overall effects of the coordination reform, including those analyzed 
in this study could be evaluated against other similar models.     
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7. CONCLUSION  
To my knowledge, this is the first study investigating the effect that the changes resulting 
from the Coordination Reform have on municipal and hospital behavior and decision making, 
as well as, delayed discharges. The results in this study give an initial look into the changes 
that occurred in transition before and after reform implementation.  
A significant difference between 2011 and 2012, seen as a decrease in the overall average 
delays in discharge, was observed. These differences are attributable to the type of municipal 
service location to which patients are being sent upon discharge, the supply of municipal 
services dictated by per person spending on nursing care and the demand for services with 
each district represented by the proportion of inhabitants over the age of 80 when controlling 
for age and gender.    
This study can function to serve as a starting point for future research on the effects of not 
only the coordination reform, but other financial incentives used in other healthcare sectors 
and systems. This additional research should examine longer periods of time before and after 
implementation to evaluate trends and give a better overall characterization of the changes. 
Likewise, further studies should consider additional variables that can further explain the 
differences by incorporating more factors that will ultimately provide more detail. The 
possibility of linking data from the different system levels, specifically the municipalities and 
hospitals would add to the level of knowledge describing the effects of the coordination 
reform. Ultimately, studies evaluating reform implementation should incorporate and evaluate 
other similar health care systems and reforms to strengthen, as well as provide additional 
results.  
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix I - Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Delayed Discharge 
Days 
16271 0 123 30864 1.90 3.526 6.194 .019 131.210 .038 
Days From Deadline 14844 -14 60 -899 -.06 2.219 3.036 .020 57.885 .040 
Payment Days 2342 1 60 6670 2.85 3.110 5.482 .051 66.966 .101 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Ready for discharge year 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
2011 Delayed Discharge 
Days 
5698 0 123 27538 4.83 4.394 6.689 .032 133.571 .065 
Days From Deadline 4337 -14 60 -3363 -.78 3.516 2.201 .037 24.090 .074 
Payment Days 1206 1 60 3803 3.15 3.421 5.509 .070 68.354 .141 
2012 Delayed Discharge 
Days 
10573 0 43 3326 .31 1.259 9.292 .024 176.938 .048 
Days From Deadline 10507 -6 43 2464 .23 1.246 8.811 .024 184.663 .048 
Payment Days 1136 1 43 2867 2.52 2.705 5.148 .073 52.788 .145 
Independent Variable Statistics 
Independent Samples Test 
Gender 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean Difference 
Male Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 1215.663 .000 51.382 6299 .000 4.501 
Equal variances not assumed   38.485 2283.684 .000 4.501 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 1378.695 .000 -13.589 5709 .000 -.942 
Equal variances not assumed   -9.555 1736.665 .000 -.942 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 6.011 .014 2.356 858 .019 .620 
Equal variances not assumed   2.365 840.726 .018 .620 
Female Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 3998.162 .000 89.395 9968 .000 4.529 
Equal variances not assumed   70.309 3942.386 .000 4.529 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 3431.623 .000 -22.365 9131 .000 -1.048 
Equal variances not assumed   -16.119 3035.555 .000 -1.048 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 23.955 .000 4.823 1480 .000 .639 
Equal variances not assumed   4.874 1403.717 .000 .639 
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Group Statistics 
Age Group 
Ready for 
discharge 
year 
Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
0-17 år 2011 3 2.67 4.619 0a . . 0a . . 
2012 7 6.14 16.252 7 6.14 16.252 1 43.00 . 
18-49 år 2011 142 4.13 5.115 84 -.05 4.024 28 3.75 4.265 
2012 339 .14 .958 335 .05 .626 11 2.82 1.662 
50-66 år 2011 591 4.29 4.652 383 -.86 3.593 95 3.58 3.642 
2012 1546 .15 .934 1528 .11 .980 80 2.61 3.168 
67-74 år 2011 685 4.75 6.190 477 -.71 3.843 129 3.88 3.721 
2012 1472 .20 .846 1466 .14 .849 108 2.27 1.868 
75-79 år 2011 628 4.61 4.270 453 -.75 3.619 132 3.14 3.588 
2012 1243 .29 1.081 1237 .23 1.103 129 2.53 2.133 
80-84 år 2011 1047 4.84 3.630 790 -.89 3.154 203 3.01 2.408 
2012 1811 .34 1.199 1801 .24 1.137 227 2.23 2.089 
85-89 år 2011 1284 4.89 3.808 1040 -.85 3.663 302 2.80 4.000 
2012 2207 .41 1.340 2190 .31 1.338 299 2.60 2.449 
90-200 år 2011 1318 5.24 4.173 1110 -.68 3.360 317 3.11 2.966 
2012 1948 .43 1.449 1943 .34 1.436 281 2.59 2.728 
a. t cannot be computed because at least one of the groups is empty. 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Age Group 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
0-17 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 1.005 .345 -.353 8 .733 -3.476 
Equal variances not assumed   -.519 7.659 .618 -3.476 
18-49 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 250.278 .000 13.787 479 .000 3.982 
Equal variances not assumed   9.209 145.156 .000 3.982 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 172.205 .000 -.442 417 .659 -.101 
Equal variances not assumed   -.230 84.011 .819 -.101 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 3.358 .075 .699 37 .489 .932 
Equal variances not assumed   .982 36.986 .333 .932 
50-66 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 908.409 .000 33.346 2135 .000 4.147 
Equal variances not assumed   21.504 608.245 .000 4.147 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 786.432 .000 -9.231 1909 .000 -.966 
Equal variances not assumed   -5.211 396.333 .000 -.966 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 3.761 .054 1.855 173 .065 .966 
Equal variances not assumed   1.877 172.808 .062 .966 
67-74 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 445.917 .000 27.680 2155 .000 4.553 
Equal variances not assumed   19.170 695.930 .000 4.553 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 960.890 .000 -7.843 1941 .000 -.844 
Equal variances not assumed   -4.757 491.190 .000 -.844 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 32.387 .000 4.079 235 .000 1.607 
Equal variances not assumed   4.302 195.457 .000 1.607 
75-79 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 665.091 .000 33.633 1869 .000 4.323 
Equal variances not assumed   24.971 667.941 .000 4.323 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 582.716 .000 -8.499 1688 .000 -.979 
Equal variances not assumed   -5.661 483.065 .000 -.979 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 6.676 .010 1.662 259 .098 .609 
Equal variances not assumed   1.672 214.187 .096 .609 
80-84 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 1165.581 .000 48.397 2856 .000 4.501 
Equal variances not assumed   38.909 1179.390 .000 4.501 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 962.157 .000 -13.351 2589 .000 -1.130 
Equal variances not assumed   -9.790 880.225 .000 -1.130 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 10.214 .001 3.623 428 .000 .786 
Equal variances not assumed   3.595 402.472 .000 .786 
85-89 år Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 1007.542 .000 50.238 3489 .000 4.484 
Equal variances not assumed   40.753 1469.935 .000 4.484 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 739.944 .000 -13.123 3228 .000 -1.162 
Equal variances not assumed   -9.924 1172.561 .000 -1.162 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed .581 .446 .748 599 .455 .203 
Equal variances not assumed   .750 499.761 .454 .203 
90-200 
år 
Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 588.318 .000 46.852 3264 .000 4.808 
Equal variances not assumed   40.222 1533.905 .000 4.808 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 778.028 .000 -11.663 3051 .000 -1.021 
Equal variances not assumed   -9.636 1344.245 .000 -1.021 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 2.572 .109 2.191 596 .029 .513 
Equal variances not assumed   2.203 595.184 .028 .513 
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Group Statistics 
Hospital Ready for discharge year 
Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation 
Akershus universitetssykehus 2011 1465 3.23 6.061 237 2.20 3.817 136 4.32 3.612 
2012 2371 .18 .908 2364 .14 .881 188 2.13 2.203 
OUS Aker 2011 593 5.90 3.421 567 -.43 3.109 167 2.90 2.905 
2012 668 .36 1.209 662 .14 1.128 68 2.34 1.750 
Diakonhjemmet 2011 1167 5.38 4.340 1151 -.96 4.392 359 3.64 4.466 
2012 1355 .80 1.948 1347 .78 1.944 407 2.62 2.757 
Lovisenberg sykehus 2011 951 5.12 2.692 919 -.91 2.612 216 2.31 2.290 
2012 2218 .08 .442 2204 .06 .428 79 1.87 1.159 
Ullevål 2011 1447 5.43 3.078 1425 -1.18 3.025 318 2.75 2.505 
2012 3780 .35 1.413 3750 .22 1.407 382 2.76 3.167 
Andre 2011 75 4.20 4.182 38 -.34 4.510 10 5.40 4.033 
2012 181 .27 1.114 180 .13 1.150 12 3.08 2.778 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Hospital 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Akershus 
universitetssykehus 
Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 786.375 .000 24.010 3834 .000 3.042 
Equal variances not assumed   19.080 1504.706 .000 3.042 
Days From Deadline Equal variances assumed 1137.148 .000 21.204 2599 .000 2.058 
Equal variances not assumed   8.278 238.528 .000 2.058 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 49.424 .000 6.736 322 .000 2.183 
Equal variances not assumed   6.257 206.636 .000 2.183 
OUS Aker Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 217.442 .000 39.217 1259 .000 5.544 
Equal variances not assumed   37.442 722.686 .000 5.544 
Days From Deadline Equal variances assumed 320.882 .000 -4.322 1227 .000 -.561 
Equal variances not assumed   -4.073 693.392 .000 -.561 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 6.537 .011 1.482 233 .140 .560 
Equal variances not assumed   1.811 200.060 .072 .560 
Diakonhjemmet Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 421.265 .000 34.961 2520 .000 4.579 
Equal variances not assumed   33.270 1565.281 .000 4.579 
Days From Deadline Equal variances assumed 426.396 .000 -13.130 2496 .000 -1.742 
Equal variances not assumed   -12.454 1530.437 .000 -1.742 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 9.214 .002 3.835 764 .000 1.016 
Equal variances not assumed   3.729 581.253 .000 1.016 
Lovisenberg sykehus Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 2110.930 .000 85.559 3167 .000 5.042 
Equal variances not assumed   57.419 972.070 .000 5.042 
Days From Deadline Equal variances assumed 2073.764 .000 -16.944 3121 .000 -.972 
Equal variances not assumed   -11.223 938.604 .000 -.972 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 9.430 .002 1.602 293 .110 .432 
Equal variances not assumed   2.127 264.349 .034 .432 
Ullevål Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 1286.004 .000 81.336 5225 .000 5.071 
Equal variances not assumed   60.275 1684.545 .000 5.071 
Days From Deadline  Equal variances assumed 1436.078 .000 -22.670 5173 .000 -1.403 
Equal variances not assumed   -16.827 1663.430 .000 -1.403 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed .444 .505 -.059 698 .953 -.013 
Equal variances not assumed   -.060 696.242 .952 -.013 
Andre Delayed Discharge 
Days 
Equal variances assumed 195.731 .000 11.724 254 .000 3.935 
Equal variances not assumed   8.032 78.386 .000 3.935 
Days From Deadline Equal variances assumed 91.612 .000 -1.244 216 .215 -.475 
Equal variances not assumed   -.645 38.022 .523 -.475 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 3.253 .086 1.591 20 .127 2.317 
Equal variances not assumed   1.538 15.538 .144 2.317 
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Group Statistics 
City District Ready for discharge year 
Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation 
Gamle Oslo 2011 273 5.63 2.687 272 -.40 2.544 73 2.40 2.487 
2012 739 .11 .589 738 .07 .571 26 2.38 1.745 
Grünerløkka 2011 347 4.75 2.408 334 -1.20 2.345 56 2.25 2.361 
2012 670 .11 .473 659 .07 .470 28 2.00 .981 
Sagene 2011 393 4.74 3.169 392 -1.36 3.186 89 2.96 2.759 
2012 764 .05 .340 763 .02 .296 11 2.00 1.265 
St. Hanshaugen 2011 245 6.11 2.903 239 .13 2.907 98 2.68 2.427 
2012 600 .15 .548 594 .13 .546 51 1.63 .937 
Frogner 2011 423 5.31 3.976 421 -.73 3.868 136 3.40 3.439 
2012 505 .80 1.827 503 .79 1.843 161 2.52 2.488 
Ullern 2011 317 5.68 3.865 316 -.33 4.183 127 3.52 3.443 
2012 330 .25 .859 329 .22 .625 51 1.43 .878 
Vestre Aker 2011 300 5.17 5.623 295 -1.93 5.547 70 4.56 7.546 
2012 407 1.41 2.666 401 1.41 2.694 184 3.11 3.229 
Nordre Aker 2011 367 5.00 2.059 365 -1.44 2.096 33 2.03 1.704 
2012 774 .12 .931 760 .08 .966 29 2.76 3.916 
Bjerke 2011 322 5.56 2.441 319 -.41 2.436 97 1.75 2.450 
2012 676 .28 .866 669 -.02 .833 63 1.24 .734 
Grorud 2011 378 3.34 4.018 218 2.59 3.525 135 4.24 3.566 
2012 678 .12 1.759 676 .08 1.686 17 3.88 10.160 
Stovner 2011 555 2.53 6.349 2 5.00 11.314 1 13.00 . 
2012 782 .29 .986 781 .27 1.004 98 2.26 1.818 
Alna 2011 622 3.88 6.601 27 -1.11 3.080 7 2.43 2.992 
2012 1033 .18 .961 1027 .13 .978 82 2.06 2.650 
Østensjø 2011 510 6.38 2.954 508 -.61 2.970 146 2.94 1.931 
2012 1204 .85 1.881 1200 .66 1.937 295 3.08 2.402 
Norstrand 2011 507 5.33 3.766 491 -1.68 3.614 107 3.50 2.873 
2012 844 .20 .937 841 .01 .625 33 1.85 1.176 
Søndre Norstrand 2011 137 5.27 3.553 137 -.88 3.567 31 3.42 3.905 
2012 567 .04 .365 566 -.04 .386 7 1.29 .756 
 
 
Independent Samples Testa 
 
City District 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Delayed 
Discharge 
Days 
Gamle Oslo Equal variances assumed 467.115 .000 52.582 1010 .000 5.521 
Equal variances not assumed   33.651 281.699 .000 5.521 
Grünerløkka Equal variances assumed 631.800 .000 48.198 1015 .000 4.646 
Equal variances not assumed   35.585 359.871 .000 4.646 
Sagene Equal variances assumed 1013.728 .000 40.437 1155 .000 4.686 
Equal variances not assumed   29.226 396.644 .000 4.686 
St. Hanshaugen Equal variances assumed 443.852 .000 48.309 843 .000 5.966 
Equal variances not assumed   31.932 251.126 .000 5.966 
Frogner Equal variances assumed 172.199 .000 22.751 926 .000 4.503 
Equal variances not assumed   21.476 569.518 .000 4.503 
Ullern Equal variances assumed 404.773 .000 24.875 645 .000 5.427 
Equal variances not assumed   24.426 345.932 .000 5.427 
Vestre Aker Equal variances assumed 50.958 .000 11.828 705 .000 3.765 
Equal variances not assumed   10.743 398.273 .000 3.765 
Nordre Aker Equal variances assumed 475.439 .000 55.087 1139 .000 4.875 
Equal variances not assumed   43.313 438.408 .000 4.875 
Bjerke Equal variances assumed 195.809 .000 50.074 996 .000 5.284 
Equal variances not assumed   37.725 359.977 .000 5.284 
Grorud Equal variances assumed 525.140 .000 18.025 1054 .000 3.223 
Equal variances not assumed   14.826 458.965 .000 3.223 
Stovner Equal variances assumed 165.800 .000 9.691 1335 .000 2.237 
Equal variances not assumed   8.230 572.992 .000 2.237 
Alna Equal variances assumed 313.137 .000 17.702 1653 .000 3.698 
Equal variances not assumed   13.885 636.894 .000 3.698 
Østensjø Equal variances assumed 149.900 .000 46.444 1712 .000 5.530 
Equal variances not assumed   39.063 690.275 .000 5.530 
Norstrand Equal variances assumed 729.165 .000 37.738 1349 .000 5.137 
Equal variances not assumed   30.156 543.840 .000 5.137 
Søndre Norstrand Equal variances assumed 482.619 .000 34.413 702 .000 5.235 
Equal variances not assumed   17.222 136.693 .000 5.235 
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Days From 
Deadline 
Gamle Oslo Equal variances assumed 451.256 .000 -4.788 1008 .000 -.478 
Equal variances not assumed   -3.068 281.113 .002 -.478 
Grünerløkka Equal variances assumed 627.772 .000 -13.439 991 .000 -1.275 
Equal variances not assumed   -9.836 346.622 .000 -1.275 
Sagene Equal variances assumed 1028.239 .000 -11.864 1153 .000 -1.379 
Equal variances not assumed   -8.552 394.463 .000 -1.379 
St. Hanshaugen Equal variances assumed 431.243 .000 .034 831 .973 .004 
Equal variances not assumed   .023 244.792 .982 .004 
Frogner Equal variances assumed 172.684 .000 -7.842 922 .000 -1.525 
Equal variances not assumed   -7.415 577.263 .000 -1.525 
Ullern Equal variances assumed 336.069 .000 -2.349 643 .019 -.548 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.304 328.521 .022 -.548 
Vestre Aker Equal variances assumed 50.925 .000 -10.502 694 .000 -3.343 
Equal variances not assumed   -9.554 396.110 .000 -3.343 
Nordre Aker Equal variances assumed 498.041 .000 -16.664 1123 .000 -1.521 
Equal variances not assumed   -13.206 439.769 .000 -1.521 
Bjerke Equal variances assumed 251.692 .000 -3.681 986 .000 -.387 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.760 353.931 .006 -.387 
Grorud Equal variances assumed 311.990 .000 14.144 892 .000 2.506 
Equal variances not assumed   10.128 249.752 .000 2.506 
Stovner Equal variances assumed 148.227 .000 6.179 781 .000 4.731 
Equal variances not assumed   .591 1.000 .660 4.731 
Alna Equal variances assumed 99.761 .000 -5.886 1052 .000 -1.240 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.089 26.138 .047 -1.240 
Østensjø Equal variances assumed 154.690 .000 -10.492 1706 .000 -1.274 
Equal variances not assumed   -8.897 696.421 .000 -1.274 
Norstrand Equal variances assumed 1082.398 .000 -13.283 1330 .000 -1.697 
Equal variances not assumed   -10.314 507.159 .000 -1.697 
Søndre Norstrand Equal variances assumed 429.761 .000 -5.501 701 .000 -.843 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.761 136.771 .007 -.843 
Payment 
Days 
Gamle Oslo Equal variances assumed .337 .563 .024 97 .981 .013 
Equal variances not assumed   .028 62.836 .978 .013 
Grünerløkka Equal variances assumed 4.265 .042 .536 82 .593 .250 
Equal variances not assumed   .683 80.097 .496 .250 
Sagene Equal variances assumed 4.473 .037 1.130 98 .261 .955 
Equal variances not assumed   1.987 24.263 .058 .955 
St. Hanshaugen Equal variances assumed 18.376 .000 2.990 147 .003 1.056 
Equal variances not assumed   3.799 138.502 .000 1.056 
Frogner Equal variances assumed 15.700 .000 2.556 295 .011 .882 
Equal variances not assumed   2.489 240.998 .013 .882 
Ullern Equal variances assumed 16.467 .000 4.269 176 .000 2.088 
Equal variances not assumed   6.341 159.545 .000 2.088 
Vestre Aker Equal variances assumed 3.927 .049 2.135 252 .034 1.443 
Equal variances not assumed   1.547 78.806 .126 1.443 
Nordre Aker Equal variances assumed 4.721 .034 -.970 60 .336 -.728 
Equal variances not assumed   -.927 37.199 .360 -.728 
Bjerke Equal variances assumed 6.880 .010 1.619 158 .107 .514 
Equal variances not assumed   1.939 120.819 .055 .514 
Grorud Equal variances assumed 4.938 .028 .291 150 .771 .355 
Equal variances not assumed   .143 16.500 .888 .355 
Stovner Equal variances assumed . . 5.880 97 .000 10.745 
Equal variances not assumed   . . . 10.745 
Alna Equal variances assumed .530 .468 .349 87 .728 .368 
Equal variances not assumed   .315 6.828 .762 .368 
Østensjø Equal variances assumed 4.281 .039 -.626 439 .532 -.143 
Equal variances not assumed   -.673 350.728 .501 -.143 
Norstrand Equal variances assumed 12.963 .000 3.205 138 .002 1.647 
Equal variances not assumed   4.774 127.658 .000 1.647 
Søndre Norstrand Equal variances assumed 5.918 .020 1.425 36 .163 2.134 
Equal variances not assumed   2.817 35.847 .008 2.134 
a. No statistics are computed for one or more split files 
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Group Statistics 
Discharged to Ready for discharge year 
Delayed Discharge Days Days From Deadline Payment Days 
N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Std. Deviation 
Hjemme 2011 2155 3.26 4.777 1316 -1.75 3.464 204 2.93 4.996 
2012 5630 .11 .907 5579 .05 .892 178 2.67 3.889 
Korttidopphold 2011 2284 5.81 3.386 1917 -.36 3.321 645 3.05 2.683 
2012 3320 .59 1.637 3314 .47 1.613 657 2.59 2.575 
Korttid samhandling 2011 5 4.80 2.950 5 -1.20 2.950 1 3.00 . 
2012 130 .25 .781 130 .21 .744 13 2.08 1.320 
Korttid intermediær 2011 124 4.48 4.067 62 -.58 3.628 16 3.81 4.053 
2012 231 .26 .887 228 .13 1.062 28 2.07 1.585 
Korttid rehabilitering 2011 662 5.76 3.443 613 -.39 3.339 183 3.30 3.135 
2012 801 .49 1.360 799 .41 1.397 152 2.36 2.160 
Korttid Vurderingsplass 2011 254 6.07 3.501 248 -.42 3.698 92 3.08 2.966 
2012 185 .64 1.274 184 .58 1.324 57 2.00 1.558 
Langtidsopphold 2011 97 8.08 10.514 83 1.13 5.021 37 5.14 4.750 
2012 150 .59 1.555 149 .44 1.535 28 2.68 2.294 
Annet 2011 115 4.61 3.629 91 -.75 4.165 28 3.46 4.615 
2012 126 .49 1.532 124 .46 1.516 23 2.48 2.761 
 
 
Independent Samples Testa 
Discharged to 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Hjemme Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 2169.566 .000 47.314 7783 .000 3.151 
Equal variances not assumed   30.407 2213.637 .000 3.151 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 2817.858 .000 -34.329 6893 .000 -1.802 
Equal variances not assumed   -18.723 1356.385 .000 -1.802 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed .479 .489 .557 380 .578 .258 
Equal variances not assumed   .566 375.293 .571 .258 
Korttidopphold Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 984.816 .000 76.709 5602 .000 5.217 
Equal variances not assumed   68.348 3021.933 .000 5.217 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 1025.148 .000 -12.097 5229 .000 -.828 
Equal variances not assumed   -10.240 2448.496 .000 -.828 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 6.513 .011 3.150 1300 .002 .459 
Equal variances not assumed   3.149 1295.441 .002 .459 
Korttid 
samhandling 
Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 29.201 .000 10.802 133 .000 4.546 
Equal variances not assumed   3.442 4.022 .026 4.546 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 31.579 .000 -3.457 133 .001 -1.408 
Equal variances not assumed   -1.066 4.020 .346 -1.408 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed . . .674 12 .513 .923 
Equal variances not assumed   . . . .923 
Korttid 
intermediær 
Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 171.570 .000 15.100 353 .000 4.212 
Equal variances not assumed   11.386 129.313 .000 4.212 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 84.296 .000 -2.593 288 .010 -.712 
Equal variances not assumed   -1.528 63.866 .131 -.712 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 10.693 .002 2.031 42 .049 1.741 
Equal variances not assumed   1.648 17.662 .117 1.741 
Korttid 
rehabilitering 
Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 332.607 .000 39.710 1461 .000 5.267 
Equal variances not assumed   37.043 831.085 .000 5.267 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 291.816 .000 -6.123 1410 .000 -.802 
Equal variances not assumed   -5.580 776.585 .000 -.802 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 6.859 .009 3.148 333 .002 .945 
Equal variances not assumed   3.254 322.543 .001 .945 
Korttid 
Vurderingsplass 
Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 73.254 .000 20.153 437 .000 5.433 
Equal variances not assumed   22.751 338.026 .000 5.433 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 94.791 .000 -3.493 430 .001 -.997 
Equal variances not assumed   -3.920 326.552 .000 -.997 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 16.857 .000 2.529 147 .012 1.076 
Equal variances not assumed   2.894 143.778 .004 1.076 
Langtidsopphold Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 31.451 .000 8.597 245 .000 7.496 
Equal variances not assumed   6.973 98.723 .000 7.496 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 76.218 .000 1.553 230 .122 .690 
Equal variances not assumed   1.220 90.624 .226 .690 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 9.633 .003 2.520 63 .014 2.457 
Equal variances not assumed   2.750 54.685 .008 2.457 
Annet Delayed 
Discharge Days 
Equal variances assumed 58.846 .000 11.648 239 .000 4.117 
Equal variances not assumed   11.281 150.483 .000 4.117 
Days From 
Deadline 
Equal variances assumed 47.983 .000 -2.972 213 .003 -1.207 
Equal variances not assumed   -2.639 107.615 .010 -1.207 
Payment Days Equal variances assumed 2.648 .110 .900 49 .373 .986 
Equal variances not assumed   .944 45.142 .350 .986 
a. No statistics are computed for one or more split files 
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Appendix II - Regressions  
Regression models for days from deadline 
 Estimate β 
Model 
Model VII 
Model VIII 
Model IX 
Model X 
Model XI 
Model XII 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
(Constant) -1.464**** .541**** -.748**** -.822 -.220* -1.287**** -2.186**** -.009 -1.289**** 
Female -.100 -.038 -.050 -.097 -.031 -.042 -.119 -.025 -.042 
Discharge Ready 2012 - - 1.179**** - - 1.160**** - - 1.156**** 
0-17 år  6.202**** 5.979****  6.099**** 5.944****  6.075**** 5.905**** 
50-66 år -.708* .004 -.198* -.829** -.013 -.227** -.962** -.031 -.239** 
67-74 år -.665* -.042 -.223* -.741* -.044 -.254** -.879** -.044 -.244** 
75-79 år -.797** -.014 -.215* -.914** -.022 -.241** -.931** -.010 -.225* 
80-84 år -.855** -.066 -.298*** -.994*** -.054 -.327*** -1.143*** -.047 -.320*** 
85-89 år -.9031** .020 -.238** -1.0181*** -.008 -.289** -1.106*** .006 -.279** 
90-200 år -.7331* .008 -.193* -.9041** -.008 -.245** -1.008** .019 -.231** 
Gamle Oslo 1.006**** -.480**** -.106 - - - - - - 
Grünerløkka -.185 -.518**** -.458**** - - - - - - 
Sagene -.258 -.587**** -.556**** - - - - - - 
St. Hanshaugen 1.322**** -.444**** .043 - - - - - - 
Frogner .204 -.002 -.036 - - - - - - 
Ullern .698** -.588**** -.150 - - - - - - 
Vestre Aker -1.135**** .643**** -.176 - - - - - - 
Nordre Aker -.901**** -.612**** -.710**** - - - - - - 
Bjerke .143 -.714**** -.447**** - - - - - - 
Grorud 3.348**** -.332*** .545**** - - - - - - 
Stovner 4.561* -.077 -.054 - - - - - - 
Alna -.530 -.283*** -.299* - - - - - - 
Norstrand -1.076**** -.704**** -.879**** - - - - - - 
Søndre Norstrand .022 -.664**** -.477**** - - - - - - 
Akershus  
universitetssykehus 
.698 -.2811*** -.0951 3.816**** .012 .375**** - - - 
OUS Aker .496*** -.077 .207*** .644**** -.059 .248**** - - - 
Diakonhjemmet .260 .078 .073 .875**** .565**** .462**** - - - 
Lovisenberg sykehus -.119 -.079 -.091 .509*** .072* .219**** - - - 
Andre -.092 -.115 .041 .997* -.020 .212 - - - 
Korttidopphold 1.876**** .400**** .746**** 1.748**** .355**** .698**** 1.519**** .370**** .665**** 
Korttid samhandling -.055 .221** .123 .599 .239** .351* .861 .211* .385** 
Korttid intermediær 1.442**** .012 .300** 1.405**** .036 .286** 1.425**** .028 .300** 
Korttid rehabilitering 1.907**** .277**** .697**** 1.814**** .278**** .704**** 1.446**** .331**** .665**** 
Korttid 
Vurderingsplass 
1.822**** .365**** .722**** 1.867**** .375**** .765**** 1.482**** .470**** .759**** 
Langtidsopphold 3.557**** .369**** 1.124**** 3.337**** .351**** 1.146**** 3.044**** .390**** 1.178**** 
Annet 1.019*** .346**** .454*** 1.047*** .343*** .508**** 1.049*** .379**** .521**** 
Percentage from 
Africa, Asia, Turkey 
and South and Central 
America 
- - - .059**** .005** .016**** - - - 
percent_pop_over_80 - - - .5631**** .1361**** .2261**** -.600**** .126**** -.028 
combined spending on 
nursing care by 1000 
NOK 
- - - -.3231**** -.0291** -.0861**** .313**** -.029**** .035*** 
Adjusted R Square .133 .110 .091 .106 .069 .075 .050 .051 .069 
Durbin-Watson 1.733 1.768 1.632 1.696 1.666 1.575 1.588 1.636 1.564 
**** = p≤0.001,  *** = p≤0.01,  ** = p≤0.05,  * = p≤0.10  
1 = VIF > 10 
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Regression models for payment days 
 Estimate β 
Model 
Model XIII Model 
XIV 
Model XV Model  
XVI 
Model XVII Model 
XVIII 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
(Constant) 3.663**** 3.948**** 4.446**** 4.360**** 3.346*** 4.018**** 2.150*** 2.598*** 2.712**** 
Female -.242 -.321 -.266** -.203 -.267* -.233* -.177 -.261* -.228* 
Discharge Ready 2012 - - -.826**** - - -.777**** - - -.696**** 
0-17 år  41.491**** 40.318****  40.459**** 40.504****  40.007**** 39.647**** 
50-66 år -.488 -.362 -.406 -.458 -.476 -.434 -.499 -.411 -.457 
67-74 år -.451 -.8301 -.582 -.371 -.8561 -.606 -.226 -.690 -.460 
75-79 år -.974 -.7621 -.905* -1.041 -.7971 -.932* -1.021 -.6291 -.846 
80-84 år -1.167* -1.0221 -1.1571** -1.124* -1.0451 -1.1351** -1.144 -.8901 -1.0541** 
85-89 år -1.311* -.5261 -.9581* -1.294 -.5801 -.9881** -1.279* -.4511 -.9211** 
90-200 år -1.040 -.5671 -.8321* -1.020 -.6091 -.8451* -.965 -.4681 -.7541 
Gamle Oslo -.320 -.549 -.702* - - - - - - 
Grünerløkka -.507 -1.086** -.949** - - - - - - 
Sagene .177 -1.277* -.453 - - - - - - 
St. Hanshaugen -.042 -1.4171*** -.722** - - - - - - 
Frogner -.058 -.508 -.483 - - - - - - 
Ullern .002 -1.533** -.731* - - - - - - 
Vestre Aker .855 .142 .280 - - - - - - 
Nordre Aker -1.201* -.405 -1.021** - - - - - - 
Bjerke -1.362*** -1.956**** -1.778**** - - - - - - 
Grorud -.6481 -2.439** -.938 - - - - - - 
Stovner 7.442** -1.469* -1.700** - - - - - - 
Alna -1.500 -1.843** -2.070*** - - - - - - 
Norstrand .561 -1.269*** -.290 - - - - - - 
Søndre Norstrand .385 -2.111** -.531 - - - - - - 
Akershus  
universitetssykehus 
2.0551** .7311 1.3311** 2.191**** .780* 1.184**** - - - 
OUS Aker .512 -.160 .098 .239 -.278 -.088 - - - 
Diakonhjemmet .587 -.1391 .232 .468 -.036 .111 - - - 
Lovisenberg sykehus -.526 -.300 -.596 -.714* -.289 -.580** - - - 
Andre 2.810** .678 1.682** 2.871*** .802 1.685*** - - - 
Korttidopphold .290 .142 .204 .309 .006 .141 .180 -.008 .094 
Korttid samhandling .392 .442 .557 .341 -.063 .324 .155 -.168 .125 
Korttid intermediær .672 -.297 .136 .742 -.336 .021 1.045 -.282 .146 
Korttid rehabilitering .545 -.041 .218 .540 -.159 .203 .520 -.166 .215 
Korttid 
Vurderingsplass 
.683 -.466 .166 .808* -.617* .130 .431 -.633* -.027 
Langtidsopphold 2.162**** .395 1.320**** 2.258**** .220 1.269**** 2.356**** .267 1.375**** 
Annet .476 .220 .367 .353 -.088 .199 .469 -.024 .291 
Percentage from 
Africa, Asia, Turkey 
and South and Central 
America 
- - - -.036** -.023 -.036*** - - - 
percent_pop_over_80 - - - -.0341 .4121* .0761 -.073 .378**** .146* 
combined spending on 
nursing care by 1000 
NOK 
- - - -.0081 -.1111 .0131 .161** -.075 .048 
Adjusted R Square .062 .243 .123 .049 .214 .108 .020 .212 .095 
Durbin-Watson 2.011 1.894 1.924 2.022 1.823 1.916 1.979 1.803 1.890 
**** = p≤0.001,  *** = p≤0.01,  ** = p≤0.05,  * = p≤0.10 
1 = VIF > 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
